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ABSTRACT 
As the planet’s population continues to grow at rate that will see a global population of 
nine billion people by the year 2050, is an era being entered into which pandemics 
involving novel viruses are the new norm? If that idea is possible, then are drug therapies 
(approved by the FDA or in the pipeline for its approval) available that either limit virus 
replication within a host cell, or reduce the body’s hyper-immune response (also known 
as “cytokine storm”) to novel or pandemic strain viruses with which states could 
supplement their existing stockpiles?  
This research explores six classes of medications that could potentially assist 
state-level governments in expanding their state-level stockpiles, to include more 
treatment and prophylaxis options, in the face of pandemics involving novel viruses. The 
results of this research were filtered through three criteria (medical efficacy, cost, 
logistical considerations) that narrow the field of candidate therapies down to four 
specific findings: one generic version of the antiviral called Ribavirin, and generic 
versions of the statins called Lipitor, Zocor and Gemfibrozil. This research may be 
applied to state and local-level public health agencies interested in bolstering their 
existing stockpiles for pandemic preparedness. 
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Humanity has but three great enemies: fever, famine and war; of these by 
far the greatest, by far the most terrible, is fever. 
 
—Sir William Osler, Science and Immorality 
 
A. PROBLEM SPACE 
Within the Homeland Security enterprise there is perhaps no greater a threat 
posed, to both the health and welfare of Americans, as well as to the health and welfare 
of the globe’s human population, than that of a global pandemic involving a novel virus. 
For all the progress humans have made on this planet, the age-old enemy of new viruses 
and the epidemics they ignite have been a persistent challenge throughout history. 
Humanity’s collective memory is marked with great plagues, such as the “Black Death,” 
and with imagery of such things as the “Fourth Horseman of the Apocalypse: Pestilence” 
that are incorporated into most holy scriptures.1 With old enemies resurging, and new 
enemies emerging, is a new phase of the human experience beginning to occur globally, 
is an epidemic of epidemics being witnessed?2 
That question, and the discussions it generated, has gained more momentum lately 
as humanity witnesses the emergence of separate, and concurrent, outbreaks of two new 
viruses: the H7N9 type-A influenza emanating from southeast China, and the Middle 
Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) emanating from northeast 
Saudi Arabia.3 Within months of each other, two unrelated and “highly pathogenic” 
viruses (e.g., type-A influenza and a human coronavirus [HCo-V]) have evolved to a 
point at which they each have successfully made ‘the biological jump’ from their animal 
1 Holy Bible (English Standard Version). Biblia.com, “Revelation 6:7–8, n.d., http://biblia.com/bible/ 
esv/Re6.7-8. 
2 Arno Karlen, Man and Microbes: Disease and Plagues in History and Modern Times (New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1996), 11. 
3 World Health Organization [WHO], “Global Overview of an Emerging Novel Coronavirus (MRS-
CoV),” presentation to the World Health Assembly, May 23, 2013, slide 2, May 23, 2013, http://www. 
who.int/csr/disease/coronavirus_infections/WHA_CoV_update_KeijiFukuda_23May13.pdf. 
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host to the human body; for H7N9, the original source appears to be poultry,4 and 
although the source species for MERS-CoV is unknown at this time, bats are being 
investigated as a possible source.5 With each of these new viruses, health officials now 
wait to see if either of these viruses will mutate to a point whereby they can sustain 
human-to-human transmission. If that occurs, then the global community could be in the 
throes of a pandemic involving a novel virus, or in a worst-case scenario, two separate 
novel viruses at the same time. 
At least one of those threats has been recognized by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and is reflected as one of the national planning scenarios listed within 
that agency’s “National Preparedness Guidelines” published in September 2007 (e.g., 
Scenario # 3: Biological Disease Outbreak—Pandemic Influenza).6 The reasoning behind 
that designation is undoubtedly the specter of a 1918-like pandemic, and rightfully so. 
That particular strain of type-A influenza managed to inflict a scale of excess mortality 
and suffering not seen before, and has not been seen since. The book by John M. Barry, 
The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, describes the 
devastation in human life that this “first great collision between nature and modern 
science” wrought upon humanity in the following way: The influenza pandemic of 
1918/1919 “killed more people in a year than the Black Death of the Middle Ages killed 
in a century; it killed more people in twenty-four weeks than AIDS has killed in twenty-
four years.”7  
As a person who spent two tours in central Africa as a Peace Corps Volunteer 
(PCV) in Gabon from 1998 to 2000, and Kenya in 2001, then later as an epidemiologist, 
4 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus,” (n.d.), 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/h7n9-virus.htm. 
5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome: Frequently 
Asked Questions/FAQs,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/faq.html; Gulfaraz Khan, “A Novel 
Coronavirus Capable of Lethal Human Infections: An Emerging Picture,” Virology Journal, 10, no. 66 
(2013):5, http://www.virologyj.com/content/101/1/66. 
6 Department of Homeland Security, “National Preparedness Guidelines–September 2007,” Appendix 
B–Capabilities-Based Preparedness Overview, September 2007, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/ 
National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf, 31. 
7 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New York, 
NY: Penguin Books, Penguin Group, 2004), 5. 
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that last comparison to Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) truly resonates for those of us there in the late 1990s and early 
2000s; a time when that latest plague upon Africa was running amok and left nearly 
unchecked. For people who witnessed the devastation that HIV/AIDS brought upon 
Africa at that time, the comparison that Mr. Barry uses is truly awful; for it also provides 
a contemporary gauge of the scale and suffering wrought upon our great-grandparents by 
the 1918–1918 influenza pandemic.  
When comparing Mr. Barry’s sobering facts with the combat casualties attributed 
to World War One (approximately 15 million people in four years), against those of the 
1918/1919 influenza (estimates of nearly twice that in six months and 50 million overall); 
it is awe inspiring what a novel virus could inflict upon an unsuspecting and 
immunologically naïve population.8 Science states that these naturally occurring 
pandemics are both normal, and to some extent, cyclical; it is not a matter of “if” 
humanity will see this sort of plague revisited, but “when.”9 
Humanity is somewhat familiar with these natural cycles of pandemics involving 
type-A influenzas. In the past century alone, four such pandemics have been witnessed 
with the most recent emerging only four years ago. The first was the 1918 H1N1 
“Spanish Influenza” that claimed more than 50 million lives globally (described by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as a severe pandemic). The second 
was the 1957 H2N2 “Asian Influenza” that claimed more than one million lives globally 
(described by the CDC as a moderate pandemic). The third was the 1968 H3N2 ‘Hong 
Kong’ influenza that claimed more than half a million lives globally (described as a mild 
pandemic), and most recently, the fourth was the 2009 H1N1 “Swine Flu” that the British 
8 Karlen, Man and Microbes: Disease and Plagues in History and Modern Times, 145; Jeffrey K. 
Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” Emerging Infectious 
Diseases, 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 20, http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1209.050979. 
9 Jeffrey K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 20, http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1209.050979. 
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medical publication, The Lancet, calculates to have claimed approximately a half million 
lives.10 
Compounding that threat, humanity now faces yet another type of virus that has 
bridged the biological divide between animal species and humans, coronaviruses. As with 
type-A influenza viruses, these coronaviruses are also derived from common illnesses 
that mutate to such a point that they develop uncommon capabilities.11 Although many 
people have, at one time or another, experienced a human coronavirus (HCoV) first-hand 
(moderate upper-respiratory tract illness commonly called a “cold”), that experience is far 
different from those observed in 2003–2004 when Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) made its dramatic debut in southeast China. Prior to that epidemic (and since 
HCoVs were first identified in the mid-1960s) science only knew of two types of human 
coronaviruses, HCoV-229E and HCoV-OC43.12 The 2003 SARS event was the first 
major and global outbreak in the post-September 11 world. When people in southeast 
China’s Quangdong Province began falling ill in both alarming numbers and with 
alarming symptoms, public health agencies, such as the World Health Organization 
(WHO), were prepared to “expect the unexpected.” The October 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks forced public health and its clinical partners to assume anything when patients 
present themselves with odd symptomology and age distribution. Yet, even in hindsight, 
both Chinese public health officials and WHO officials were shocked by what they 
found; a new and easily transmitted virus between people, who once exposed, would 
become very ill with far too many dying from complications.13 
10 Rachelle Salomon and Robert G. Webster, “The Influenza Virus Enigma,” Cell, 136 no. 3 (2009): 
402–410; Martin I. Meltzer, “Basic Instructions and Template of Draft Report: Using FluAid and FluSurge 
to Estimate the Potential Impact of the Next Influenza Pandemic upon Locale Y,” Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC], March 22, 2006, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/ 
downloads/pandemic-impact-estimate-instructions.pdf, 3; Fatimah S. Dawood et al., “Estimated Global 
Mortality Associated with the First 12 Months of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A H1N1 Virus Circulation: A 
Modeling Study,” The Lancet Infectious Diseases 12, no. 9 (September 2012): 687–695. 
11 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], Coronavirus Homepage, “About 
Coronaviruses,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/about/index.html. 
12 L. van der Hoek et al., “Identification of a New Human Coronavirus,” Nature Medicine 10, no. 4 
(April 2004): 368–373.  
13 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Remembering SARS: A Deadly Puzzle and the 
Efforts to Solve It,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/sars/feature.htm. 
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This was humanity’s first recorded experience with highly pathogenic 
coronaviruses, when a regional outbreak raced across Asia, and then the globe. In the 
eight-month rampage of that novel virus, the WHO calculates that SARS managed to 
infect a total of 8,098 people worldwide (in 37 countries) with 774 losing their lives to 
this infection. When the number of SARS-attributed deaths is divided into the total 
number of confirmed SARS cases, this generates a case fatality rate (CFR) of 9.6 percent. 
This combination of a novel virus, matched with an impressive transmissibility and high 
CFR, created a great amount of fear and consternation amongst the global community of 
public health and healthcare partners.14 
It is against that backdrop that this research focuses on possible pharmaceutical 
interventions that would help expand the list of options public health could employ in a 
response. This research explores current and proposed medicines available in the United 
States (U.S.) medical system’s inventory (e.g., Federal Drug Administration [FDA] 
approved, or pending such an approval) that could help provide a treatment and/or 
prophylaxis option for pandemic-strain novel viruses. A review of single-medication and 
multi-medication protocols is researched. An overview of existing literature explains 
what the current trends and recommendations are amongst clinical researchers addressing 
novel and pandemic strain viruses (specifically type-A influenzas and HCoV), which is 
followed by a detailed examination of what science is currently telling the public health 
community.  
The results of this research are intended to meet an identified need by the state of 
Nevada’s Division of Public and Behavioral Health (DPBH) as it continues to prepare for 
possible future operations against a potential H7N9 and/or MERS Co-V response. 
Therefore, any calculations or estimates used in this research utilize Nevada-specific 
data, with any recommendations being intended for implementation within Nevada for its 
2.7 million citizens.  
The fourth chapter compares what science is recommending against the three 
criteria that the Nevada DPBH would need met, if it were to select a therapy for an 
14 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Frequently Asked Questions About SARS,” 
(n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.pdf. 
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expanded state stockpile: medical efficacy, cost, and logistical considerations. The fifth 
and final chapter summarizes these findings and makes recommendations that fit within 
the aforementioned criteria.  
B.  BACKGROUND 
1. Lessons from the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic 
When addressing the threat posed by any novel type-A influenza, the best 
example is that of the 1918–1919 “Spanish” Influenza (so named because the neutral and 
uncensored Spanish press was the first to report on this war-time news story).15 In terms 
of both its global scale, its excess morbidity (number of people it made very sick), and its 
excess mortality (the number of people it killed beyond the deaths normally expected 
from old age, heart attacks, etc.), it is truly the “Mother of All Pandemics.”16 In 
researching the literature for this specific pandemic, an abundance of data and analysis 
exists concerning this global event. As a result of this wealth of information, lessons to be 
learned from this event could be applied to any and all such future events of this scale 
and magnitude. 
2.  Lessons from the 2003–2004 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) Pandemic 
Although this event was caused by a different type of virus (CoV are classified as 
belonging to the “positive sense single-strand Ribonucleic Acid (RNA) virus” group, and 
type-A influenzas are classified as belonging to the “negative sense single-strand RNA 
virus” group within the Baltimore Classification system), it serves as a case-study of how 
modern public health, on a global scale, responds to completely new viral threats.17 This 
event also serves as a study (within the science of communicable diseases) of a 
15 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 171–172. 
16 Taubenberger and Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” 15. 
17 David Baltimore, “Expression of Animal Virus Genomes,” Bacteriology Reviews 35, no. 3 
(September 1971): 235–241. 
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phenomenon called “super spreaders” and how a highly pathogenic novel virus can go 
from a regional issue, to a global crisis, within days to weeks.18 
3.  Common Causes of Fatality between the 1918 Influenza and 2003 
SARS Outbreaks 
Although these two events are separated by 85 years and decades of medical 
advances, the biological processes that take the lives of those who succumb to either of 
these illnesses are quite similar. Each of these infections, at their root, are an invasion of 
a novel virus into the human body’s respiratory system. These two separate infections 
even share common modes of transmission between cases, referred to as droplet and 
contact exposures (e.g., droplet exposures occur when the body ejects pathogens by 
coughing sneezing, and then those fall to the ground, and contact exposures occur when 
pathogens remain on surfaces that people often touch such as handrails and elevator 
buttons, and then touch their eyes/nose/mouth). For a significant portion of the total 
fatalities associated with each of these infections (some researchers have attributed as 
much as 50%), the cause of death was often described as viral pneumonia (an infection of 
the lungs that significantly reduces that organ’s ability to provide oxygen to the rest of 
the body).19 In the intervening years since the 1918 event, physicians have developed a 
term for this “pathological process” that “puts extreme stress on the lungs,” called Acute 
Respiratory Distress Syndrome or ARDS, for short.20 Almost unique to each of the 
illnesses this thesis reviews, is an over-reaction of an infected body’s immune system to 
contain and defeat an invading pathogen; this phenomenon is known simply as a 
“cytokine storm.”21 The interplay between exposure, infection, the descent to ARDS, and 
the resulting cytokine storm, shall be discussed in detail later in this thesis. 
18 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Remembering SARS: A Deadly Puzzle and the 
Efforts to Solve It.” 
19 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 252. 
20 Ibid., 250. 
21 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 249–251. 
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4.  Public Health Response Options in the Face of a Pandemic 
By definition, any novel virus is a biological threat against which humans have 
very little, or no defense. When faced with a challenge of this type, everyone, to use an 
old euphemism, is “in the same boat.’’ A common aspect of pandemics involving novel 
viruses is that the tools most often relied upon to protect the populace from these 
biological invaders have basically no effect on them. Current medicines, antibiotics and 
the medical system become of little value, and are thus forced to return to a model of 
medicine that resembles that of bygone ages (e.g., isolation and quarantine, etc.). These 
illnesses are often referred to as “crowd diseases” because they transmit efficiently 
through densely populated hubs of people.22 In this sense, they are brutally efficient at 
breaking the social bonds that bring people together: family kinship, friendship, 
professional colleagues, etc.   The bonds are broken when the fear of contracting an 
illness without any known treatment or vaccination outweighs one of the most primal 
human needs, being a “social creature.” When the threat feared most can be brought to 
people by family/friends/acquaintances, then the bonds that hold everyone together can 
be temporarily torn.23  
Under these conditions, public health is forced to employ strategies that resemble 
“measures used since antiquity, such as quarantine and social distancing.”24 In the case of 
the 2003–2004 SARS epidemic, those “measures used since antiquity” worked rather 
well in some countries (e.g., Vietnam and Canada) and not nearly so well in others (e.g., 
China). In the case of the 1918–1919 influenza, the impact of those measures varied from 
town to town, and from city to city.25 State and local health departments wrestle with 
how to cope with a prolonged pandemic to novel viruses by organizing their response 
options into various groups, with the state health division in Nevada being no different. In 
22 Arno Karlen, Man and Microbes: Disease and Plagues in History and Modern Times, 48–49. 
23 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 336–338. 
24 Alexandra Minna Stern, Martin S., Cetron, and Howard Markel, “The 1918–1919 Influenza 
Pandemic in the United States: Lessons Learned and Challenges Exposed, Guest Editorial), Public Health 
Reports 125, suppl. 3 (2012): 6. 
25 Richard J. Hatchett, Carter E. Mecher, and Marc Lipsitch, “Public Health Interventions and 
Epidemic Intensity During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic,” in Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences [PNAS] 104, no. 18 (May 1, 2007), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0610941104. 
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the months following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza response, the Nevada public 
health preparedness (PHP) program developed something called the “Public Health 
Toolbox” in an effort to help non-public health response partners better understand what 
public health could “bring to the table.” That “toolbox” is shorthand for a long acronym 
called the Vaccination, Medication, Antivirals, Isolation, Quarantine, Hygiene, Social 
Distancing (VMAIQHS) model. This model lists, in order of efficacy, the various 
interventions that public health could possibly employ to counter a biological threat. The 






• Hygiene (to include decontamination if applicable and personal protective 
equipment (PPE) 
• Social Distancing 
The intent of this research is not to determine if this VMAIQHS model currently 
used by the state Nevada is valid and/or generalizable; rather, this model is used as an 
example to help provide the reader with a context of how one state organizes its response 
options in the face of biological threats.  
a.  The Prevention-based Model 
The aforementioned model used as an example reflects the national focus 
on preventing an outbreak of disease involving a biological threat, which has been a 
major cornerstone of the CDC’s Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) when it 
developed a “national repository of life-saving pharmaceuticals and medical supplies.”26 
In response to the 2009–2010 H1N1 response, many of the processes that states had 
trained and exercised for were put into action. In April 2009, the CDC released 25% of 
each state’s allocation of antiviral drugs (e.g., Oseltamivir/Tamiflu and 
26 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “A National Repository of Life-Saving 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies,” October 2012, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/stockpile.htm. 
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Zanamivir/Relenza), PPE, and respiratory protection devices to help bolster state 
capabilities in the face of the H1N1 outbreak.27 This large injection of prevention 
materials have expanded public health’s capabilities at the state and local level; and for 
states like Nevada that did not have a lot of experience with long-term storage of state-
level stockpiles, the H1N1 response materials have provided that experience. With the 
ensuing large-scale deployment by the CDC of an effective vaccination in the autumn of 
2009, a large amount of the antiviral medications/PPE/respiratory protection materials 
from H1N1 remain in state stockpiles to this day (as is the case in Nevada). With the 
emergence of the concurrent H7N9 and MERS-CoV threats to public health, these 
existing state stockpiles will be factored into the plans and preparations of state-level 
public health agencies.  
b.  The Treatment-based Model 
In both the 1918 Influenza and 2003 SARS events, public health was 
forced to respond without many of the components listed within the VMAIQHS model. 
Of particular note was the lack of a viable vaccine and lack of any curative medications 
such as antibiotics or antivirals. With new research revealing breakthrough technologies, 
and the pharmaceutical industry creating new medications, are options available now that 
previous generations lacked in 1918, and the current generation lacked during the 2003 
SARS outbreak? This research explores possible pharmaceutical solutions that state 
health departments could stockpile in an effort to expand their current stockpiles and to 
provide a true “treatment option” in the face of a pandemic response. 
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Are drug therapies (FDA approved or in the pipeline for FDA approval) available 
that either limit virus replication within a host cell, or reduce the body’s hyper-immune 
response (a.k.a. “cytokine storm,” which is a hyper-immune response by the body to an 
invading pathogen) to novel (pandemic strain) viruses with which states could 
27 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “CDC Health Update: Swine Influenza A 
(H1N1) Update: New Interim Recommendations and Guidance for Health Directors about Strategic 
National Stockpile Material,” distributed via Health Alert Network/HAN on April 26, 2009 at 11:45 PM 
EST, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/HAN/042609.htm. 
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supplement their existing stockpiles? This research attempts to identify possible drug 
therapies against novel and pandemic strain viruses that could be employed within the 
United States at state-level public health departments. These findings could be used to 
help state health departments expand their current capabilities from a prevention-based 
model to include a more robust treatment-based model of response as well.  
As potential therapies are revealed, they will then need to fit within three specific 
criteria for a state health division, such as Nevada’s, to purchase them: medical efficacy, 
cost, and logistical considerations. This research also reviews combining existing drug 
therapies already stockpiled within state health departments (e.g., antibiotics, antivirals, 
etc.) with potential therapies revealed in this thesis. The intent is to provide public health 
leadership at the state level with more options than currently available in the face of a 
potential pandemic involving any sort of novel virus (such as the H7N9 threat emerging 
from China and the new MERS-CoV threat emanating from Saudi Arabia).28 
28 World Health Organization [WHO], “Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus,” (n.d.), http://www.who.int/ 
influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/; World Health Organization [WHO]. “WHO 
Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations [IHR] Emergency Committee 
Concerning MERS-CoV,” July 17, 2013, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2013/ 
mers_cov_20130717/en/. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review included for this research spans a wide range of publications 
from a broad selection of resources. While researching two separate epidemics that 
occurred 85 years apart from each other, special care was given to include a wide sample 
of texts and articles that span this length of time. As a result, the reader will notice that 
many of the books and texts cited throughout this research have publication dates that go 
back as far as 1918. The intent was to capture as much of the “original” data and 
reporting that government officials published in the months and years following each of 
these global health events. In addition, these books and texts are intended to help 
establish the context and framework in which each of these large-scale epidemics 
occurred, with the hope that they may yield clues as to how to deal with future epidemics 
of this scale.  
Pandemics pose a unique challenge to homeland security practitioners because of 
their scale, duration, lethality, and sudden onset. These threats are reflected within a 
series of core homeland security documents: the National Health Security Strategy, the 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), the Target Capabilities List 
(TCL), just to name a few.29 Together these documents (and similar ones) help prevent 
“black swan” events (a.k.a. events that have low probability of occurring, but high 
consequence if they do occur) like those of the 1918 Influenza and the 2003 SARS 
epidemics from fading away in collective memory.30 Based on the fact that pandemic 
influenza is still listed as third on the national roster of national planning scenarios speaks 
29 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], National Health Security Strategy 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2011), http://www.phe.gov/ 
Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Pages/default.aspx; Govtrack.us, “H.R. 307: Pandemic All-Hazards 
Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013, 113th Congress, 2013–2015, Text as of March 19, 2013,” 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr307/text; Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 
“Target Capabilities List [TCL],” September 2007, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf. 
30 Nassim N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York, NY: Random 
House Trade Paperback Edition, 2010), 7. 
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volumes as to how federal, state, and local levels of government perceive this low 
probability/high consequence threat.31 
Whereas the books and texts included within this literature review provide a more 
macro view of the 1918 influenza event, and the 2003 SARS event, the scientific reports 
and articles help provide a more micro view of trends within the clinical community for 
possible treatments related to cytokine storm in patients suffering from pandemic strain 
viruses. In an effort to achieve this goal, this literature review relied on U.S. government 
articles and reports (e.g., CDC, National Institutes of Health [NIH], etc.), professional 
journals of U.S. origin, and current scientific research. These resources were identified 
and located through heavy use of ProQuest and PubMed from the Dudley Knox Library’s 
online system at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). As discussed briefly in the 
introduction to this thesis, the primary focus of this research is to identify possible drug 
therapies against novel and pandemic strain viruses that could be employed within the 
United States at state-level public health departments. As a result, non-U.S. 
texts/research/journals were not used in great numbers for this research. The majority of 
the references used throughout this research were gleaned from a wide range of books 
and articles.  
A.  NOVEL VIRUSES AS A THREAT TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
From a Homeland Security perspective, why even study a naturally occurring 
epidemic like the 1918 Influenza event, or the 2003 SARS event? Surely, more 
manageable and pragmatic topics exist on which to write a thesis for a school, such as the 
U.S. Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS). Yet, the research within this 
thesis has revealed that “diseases have been the biggest killers of people, they have also 
been decisive shapers of history.”32 As terrible as the casualty counts of America’s 
various conflicts have been, as well as those of terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens, both in 
31 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], “National Preparedness Guidelines, Appendix 
B–Capabilities-Based Preparedness Overview,” September 2007, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency 
/nrf/National_Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf. 
32 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton and Company, Inc., paperback edition, 1999), 197. 
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this country and abroad; they pale in comparison to the death tolls wrought upon the 
American people from naturally occurring diseases. Although scientific and medical 
advances have provided more tools to combat infectious disease, and the “means 
available to fight disease are infinitely more sophisticated than ever seen in human 
history,” to this day, this nation is still “uniquely vulnerable to viral diseases.”33 In spite 
of all the advances to help prevent diseases and/or cure them, why are “strange new 
diseases that have leaped up out of nowhere and grabbed the world by the throat” still 
seen?34  
The available literature is both abundant and detailed in describing how novel 
viruses impact human societies; by their very nature, novel viruses leave bodies 
unprepared to meet these unfamiliar invaders with their uncommon lethality to immune 
systems.35 Although plentiful examples of contemporary literature are available on the 
1918 Influenza, the most compelling texts come from the people who witnessed that 
pandemic directly, as either a patient suffering from the illness, or as clinicians trying 
desperately to aid the afflicted. From the perspective of the patients, perhaps no better 
example helps describe in excruciating detail what it was like to be ill with the 1918 
influenza virus than Katherine Anne Porter’s book Pale Horse, Pale Rider originally 
published in 1939. As a journalist working in Denver, Colorado (in the fall of 1918), Ms. 
Porter fell ill with influenza and recounts in haunting detail what it was like to be both ill, 
and near death, with an illness that disabled her for over a month.36 In her book, she 
describes the physical pain brought on by an infection of this type as such:  
Pain returned, a terrible compelling pain running through her veins like 
heavy fire, the stench of corruption filled her nostrils, the sweetish 
sickening smell of rotting flesh and pus; she opened her eyes and saw pale 
33 Thomas Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, paperback edition 2007), 14. 
34 Ibid., 88. 
35 Gina Kolata, “The 1918 Flu Killed Millions: Does it Hold Clues for Today?,” New York Times, 
March 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/teachers/featured_articles/20060328tuesday.html. 
36 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 394. 
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light through a coarse white cloth over her face, knew that smell of death 
was in her own body, and struggled to lift her hand.37 
Elsewhere in the literature are narratives from the healthcare workers responsible 
for the care of those like Ms. Porter who were ill with the virus. Although the texts used 
in this review are replete with vivid descriptions of what it was actually like, perhaps the 
most poignant were those of Dr. Victor C. Vaughan, Dean of the University of Michigan 
Medical School, who was called to military service to advise then-U.S. Army Surgeon 
General William Gorgas. In his book, A Doctor’s Memories (published in 1926), Dr. 
Vaughan describes the impact that the 1918 Influenza had on humanity as such: 
It encircled the world, visited the remotest corners, taking toll of the most 
robust, sparing neither soldier nor civilian, and flaunting its red flag in the 
face of science.38  
Common in name only, the symptoms and severity of highly pathogenic influenza 
viruses, such as the 1918 strain, as well as those of novel HCoV, are far different from 
the annual inconvenience that many have grown to regard seasonal influenza (or HCoV) 
to be. When these common viruses mutate to such an extent that they, for reasons still not 
fully understood, develop uncommon capabilities, modern medicine is left to scramble 
together a response. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF PANDEMICS INVOLVING A NOVEL VIRUS 
In the two case studies of pandemics used throughout this thesis, four common 
shared characteristics have been identified, with core lessons being generated that are 
germane to planning for future pandemics.  
The first shared characteristic to each of these epidemics (and perhaps the most 
obvious) would be the speed by which they circumnavigated the globe. The 1918 
influenza took approximately four months to cross the planet, while the 2003 SARS 
37 Katherine A. Porter, Pale Horse, Pale Rider (New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1939), 
201. 
38 Victor C. Vaughan, A Doctor’s Memories (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1926), 432. 
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epidemic took a mere 90 days.39 Global air travel has given novel viruses a direct conduit 
to all the world’s major population hubs. The spread and frequency of today’s air travel 
system ensures that a sick person from Hong Kong (to use an example from SARS) could 
be carried to any point in Southeast Asia within three to four hours, to Europe within 12 
hours, and to North America within 18 hours.40 As the “global village” continues to grow 
and expand into areas not previously settled or inhabited by humans, this trend of rising 
rates of deadly infectious diseases, from previously unknown pathogens, matched with a 
global travel system, will continue to challenge both homeland security and public health 
agencies throughout this shared planet.41 
 
Figure 1.  “U-” and “W-” Shaped Combined Influenza and Pneumonia Mortality, by 
Age at Death, per 100,000 Persons in Each Age Group, United States, 1911–
1918. Influenza- and Pneumonia-Specific Death Rates Are Plotted for the 
Interpandemic Years 1911–1917 (Dashed Line) and for the Pandemic Year 
(1918) (Solid Line).42 
39 Alfred W. Crosby, America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 28; Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, VIII. 
40 Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, 11. 
41 Howard Markel, When Germs Travel, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2004), 9. 
42 Jeffrey K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 12, no. 1 (January 2006): Figure 2, 19, 
http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/12/1/05-0979-f2.htm. 
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The second characteristic to each of these pandemics are the odd age distribution 
ranges within a population. These types of pandemic viruses seem to gravitate toward the 
middle age ranges (e.g., the 20- to 50-year olds). Normally, when a common strain of 
type-A influenza or coronavirus (CoV) infects humans, illness is often manifested within 
the younger and older age ranges of a given population since the younger members of the 
population do not yet have fully developed immune systems, while older members have 
immune systems that are, generally speaking, on the decline. When plotted on a graph, 
which is referred to in epidemiology as a U-shaped age distribution of disease, this age 
range can be seen, as depicted above in Figure 1 from the Taubenberger/Morens article 
for the 1918 Influenza, and again described in a separate piece, to a lesser extent, for the 
2003 SARS event by Liang et al.43 What is observed with pandemic-strain viruses is their 
unique ability to infect those middle age ranges, thus forming what is called the W-
shaped age distribution of illness. An unfortunate aspect to this sort of distribution is the 
fact that many of the people within the middle age ranges who succumb to their illness, 
were family members of the ill who tended to their loved one(s), or healthcare workers 
doing their job to help save lives. Thomas Abraham does a thorough study of this pattern 
of a novel virus “spreading among hospital workers and close contacts of patients” in his 
book about the 2003 SARS epidemic.44 
A third characteristic shared between these two epidemics is the limitation of at 
least a six- to twelve-month delay from when a novel-strain pandemic begins, and when 
an effective vaccine strategy is produced and disseminated worldwide.45 Thus, one of 
public health’s most successful “tools” will be unavailable in the opening salvo of a novel 
virus’ attack on humanity. In light of this reality, a sensible strategy for federal/state/local 
partners to take would be a delaying action with the intent of preventing the number of 
43 Taubenberger and Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” Figure 2, 19; W. Liang 
et al., “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, Beijing, 2003,” U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention [CDC] 10, no. 1 (January 2004): Figure 3, 28. http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/10/1/03-
0553.htm. 
44 Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, 57. 
45 Elena A. Govorkova and Robert G. Webster, “Combination Pharmaceutical Therapy for Influenza,” 
National Center for Biotechnology Information 2, no. 8 (August 2010): 1510, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC3185732/#__ffn_sectitle. 
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new cases (a.k.a. incidence rate) from increasing exponentially while awaiting a viable 
vaccine to be developed and distributed.  
The fourth and final characteristic of these two pandemics, within the range of 
this literature review, are the physiological mechanisms that ultimately cause fatality 
within infected patients, a phenomenon referred to as a “cytokine storm.” In an odd twist, 
it is not the virus itself that takes the lives of its victims; it is a hyper-immune response 
that ultimately overwhelms the body of those who succumb. This nuance (as related to 
pandemic strain viruses) is discussed in detail by Alleva et al. in their article:  
It is now generally accepted that the infectious agent in isolation does not 
cause the illness and fatal outcome seen in acute systemic infectious 
diseases. Instead, the pathogen induces host cells to generate excessive 
amounts of pro-inflammatory cytokines...thus generating the disease we 
observe. This general concept….is now often referred to as the “cytokine 
storm.”46 
Under normal conditions, young adults have the most robust immune systems that 
are often the most capable of repelling an invader, thus making them the healthiest 
element of the population. Yet, highly pathogenic novel viruses (such as the two 
described in this thesis) have figured out a way to turn that strength into a weakness:47 
In 1918 the immune systems of young adults mounted massive responses 
to the virus. That immune response filled the lungs with fluid and debris, 
making it impossible for the exchange of oxygen to take place. The 
immune response killed.48 
C.  SUMMARY 
With the planet’s population expected to surpass nine billion people by the year 
2050, pandemic strain viruses will continue to emerge as people and populations 
penetrate into unfamiliar ecosystems and become exposed to new pathogens. From a 
Homeland Security perspective, these threats will manifest themselves with little 
46 Lisa M. Alleva, Charles Cai, and Ian A. Clark, “Using Complimentary and Alternative Medicines to 
Target the Host Response during Severe Influenza,” Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine7 no. 4 (2010): 501, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ecam/nep152. 
47 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 249.  
48 Ibid., 249–250. 
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warning, and with potentially catastrophic results. With novel viruses being (by 
definition) completely new to the human immune system, the best defense against them 
would be vaccination (as per the VMAIQHS model described within the introduction to 
this thesis). As Thomas Abraham explains in his book about SARS, a delay may occur 
between the time when a pandemic begins, and the time when an effective vaccine is 
available:  
The only way to prevent an influenza pandemic is through large scale 
vaccination. Vaccines will have to be tailor-made for any new flu virus, 
and time as well as money will be a constraint. Developing the vaccine, 
subjecting it to clinical trials and then getting it ready for commercial 
production will take at least six months to a year.49 
In those intervening months, federal, state, and local partners will need to limit the 
number of new infections with a series of treatment strategies (e.g., using antivirals to 
help limit a virus’ ability to make copies of itself within a host cell, using statins to help 
limit the body’s hyper immune response), and prevention strategies, (e.g., 
isolation/quarantine/hygiene/PPE/social distancing, collectively known as non-
pharmaceutical interventions or NPIs). 
This thesis shall focus on expanding the options currently available to state-level 
governments for treatment strategies, as well as for prophylaxis strategies, in the face of a 
pandemic strain virus. The hope is to build upon existing state stockpiles of AVs leftover 
from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (Tamiflu and Relenza), and to augment those with other 
pharmaceutical therapies that could be effective against yet-to-be determined novel 
viruses, would be cost effective, and would fit within Nevada’s existing logistics system 
for bulk storage of medications.  
49 Abraham, Twenty-First Century Plague: The Story of SARS, 140. 
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III.  METHOD 
The issue of how governments will respond to pandemics involving a novel virus 
has received a high level of attention since the identification of a new and highly 
pathogenic (in other words, it can easily transmit between people and cause appreciable 
illness within them) avian influenza in the late 1990s identified as H5N1. An explanation 
of this system to identify new influenza viruses is provided in Chapter IV. From the 
analysis of data for this thesis, the current body of knowledge surrounding potential 
treatment options for pandemic-strain viruses appear to focus on two mechanisms to 
reduce disease in severely ill people, limit virus replication in the host cell, and/or, 
suppression of the body’s hyper-immune response to inhibit the cytokine storm and 
ARDS. The literature revealed six classes of drugs that have demonstrated an ability 
either to inhibit virus replication, or to suppress the immune system: antivirals, 
antibiotics, statins, interferons, corticosteroids, and herbal/alternative medications. With 
such a wide field of potential therapies, three screening criteria are applied within this 
analysis chapter and defined as such.  
A. MEDICAL EFFICACY 
Medical efficacy is defined as a pharmaceutical therapy’s ability either to reduce 
virus replication within a host cell by an appreciable and observable amount, or to reduce 
the body’s immune response by an appreciable and observable amount. Studies involving 
human subjects are weighted more than those involving animal tests because animal 
models do not necessarily translate into the human population. 
B. COST 
Pandemics are by definition, large in scale, and wide ranging. In preparation for 
any pandemic, projections for how many pharmaceutical therapy doses and regimens 
should be needed to form a state stockpile would likely be in the tens of thousands. With 
such a large amount needed, pricing estimates for these therapies need to be no greater 
than 1% of Nevada’s total PHP grant. This percentage is based off what Nevada’s PHP 
program has retrospectively been able to afford, as well as prospective grant funding 
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estimates. Although national registries provide wholesale price estimates (e.g., a 
nationally distributed document called the Red Book), access to these sites often require 
authorization. In an effort to make price quotes cited within this thesis accessible to all 
readers, an online website called www.GoodRx.com is used to create citable price quotes 
specific to Nevada’s projections for the number of regimens it may need to create a 
supplemental state stockpile. 
C. LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
With federal grant funding for state-level PHP programs on the decline, state PHP 
programs, such as Nevada’s, will need to rely on its existing climate-controlled bulk-
storage warehousing capability. Any potential pharmaceutical therapies revealed by this 
thesis shall need to fit within Nevada PHP’s existing warehouse system (e.g., capable of 
being stored in climate-controlled facilities long term, no cold-chain requirements, etc.). 
With such a wide variety of possible therapies represented within the literature, 
Table 1 lists those captured within the literature review. Each column is intended to walk 
the reader through a brief overview of each therapy’s major features. The “citations” 
column provides a synopsis of authors who have conducted related research. The “uses” 
column describes if the therapy can be used as a prophylaxis (given to people who may 
have been exposed but have not yet demonstrated any symptoms) and/or as a treatment 
(people who have been exposed and are demonstrating symptoms). The “pros” and 
“cons” columns are self explanatory. The “medical efficacy’’ column describes if the 
therapy is known to have a positive effect, or if it is still being studied through 
experimentation. Please keep in mind that “known” therapies may be listed as 
“experimental” for the simple fact that some old medications are being reviewed for 
different and innovative new uses. As with almost any medication, long-term immunity is 
not imparted upon the patient (as would be achieved through immunizations); thus, in an 
effort to keep the Table 1 from being too crowded, that fact would apply to all listed 
therapies as a “con.”  
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Table 1.   Comparison of Different Therapy Options 








Cooper et al.53 
Treanor et al.54 
Nicholson et al.55 
Aoki et al.56 
Salomon et al.57 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes 
• Already in 
national/state 
stockpiles 
• Familiar to 
clinicians & public 
health 
• Easily stored long 
term 
• FDA licensed for 
influenza type A and 
B 
• Possibly mismatched 
to virus strain 
• Drug Resistance 
• When used as 
prophylaxis, repeated 




50 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “What You Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ 
antivirals/whatyoushould.htm. 
51 John Beigel and Mike Bray, “Current and Future Antiviral Therapy of Severe Seasonal and Avian Influenza, Antiviral Research 78, no. 1 (April 
2008): 91–102.  
52 Anne Moscona, “Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Influenza,” The New England Journal of Medicine [NEJM] 353 (September 29, 2005): 1363–
1373. 
53 Nicola J. Cooper et al., “Effectiveness of Neuraminidase Inhibitors in Treatment and Prevention of Influenza A and B: Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,” British Medical Journal [BMJ], 326, no. 7401 (June 7, 2003): 1235.  
54 John J. Treanor et al., “Efficacy and Safety of the Oral Neuraminidase Inhibitor Oseltamivir in Treating Acute Influenza,” JAMA: the Journal of 
the American Medical Association 283, no. 8 (2000): 1016–1024. 
55 K. G., Nicholson et al., “Efficacy and Safety of Oseltamivir in Treatment of Acute Influenza: A Randomised Controlled Trial,” The Lancet 355, 
no. 9218 (2000): 1845–1850.  
56 F. Y. Aoki et al., “Early Administration of Oral Oseltamivir Increases the Benefits of Influenza Treatment,” Journal of Antimicrobial 
Chemotherapy 51, no. 1 (2003): 123–129.  
57 Salomon, and Webster, “The Influenza Virus Enigma,” 402–410.  
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Hayden et al.60 
Cooper et al.61 
Makela et al.62 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes 
• Already in 
national/state 
stockpiles 
• Familiar to 
clinicians and public 
health 
• Easily stored long 
term 
• FDA licensed for 
influenza type A and 
B 
• Mismatched to strain 
• Drug Resistance 
• When used as 
prophylaxis, repeated 












• Easily stored long-
term 
• Only approved for 
influenza type A 




58 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “What You Should Know About Flu Antiviral Drugs.” 
59 Moscona, “Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Influenza,” 1363–1373.  
60 Frederick G. Hayden et al., “Efficacy and Safety of the Neuraminidase Inhibitor Zanamivir in the Treatment of Influenzavirus Infections,” New 
England Journal of Medicine 337, no. 13 (1997): 874–880.  
61 Cooper et al., “Effectiveness of Neuraminidase Inhibitors in Treatment and Prevention of Influenza A and B: Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials,” 1235.  
62 M. J. Mäkelä et al., “Clinical Efficacy and Safety of the Orally Inhaled Neuraminidase Inhibitor Zanamivir in the Treatment of Influenza: A 
Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled European Study,” Journal of Infection 40, no. 1 (2000): 42–48; Salomon, and Webster, “The Influenza 
Virus Enigma,” 402–410. 
63 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Influenza Antiviral Drug Resistance,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/ 
antiviralresistance.htm. 
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• Easily stored long-
term 
• Only approved for 
influenza type A 







(nucleoside antimetabolite drug) 
van Vonderen et al.65 
Hayden66 
Chan-Tack et al.67 
Salomon et al.68 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes 
• Easily stored long 
term 
• Generics available 
• Not in stockpiles 
• New to public health 
• Can induce anemia 







Tetracycline Class: Doxycycline 
Penicillin Class: 
Amoxicillin 
Morens et al.69 
Wright et al.70 
Prophylaxis: Not 
against viral infection, 
yes for secondary 
bacterial infections 
Treatment: Same as 
above 
• Already in national 
stockpiles 
• Familiar to care 
providers and public 
• Easily stored long 
term 
• Generics are 
available and 
affordable 
• Only effective against 
bacterial infections 




64 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Influenza Antiviral Drug Resistance.” 
65 M. G. Van Vonderen et al., “Ribavirin in the Treatment of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS),” Netherlands Journal of Medicine, 61, 
no. 238 (2003): 42.  
66 Frederick G. Hayden, “Antivirals for Pandemic Influenza,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 176, suppl., 1 (1997): S56–S61.  
67 Kirk M. Chan-Tack, Jeffrey S. Murray, and Debra B. Birnkrant. “Use of Ribavirin to Treat Influenza,” New England Journal of Medicine 361, 
no. 17 (2009): 1713–1714.  
68 Salomon, and Webster, “The Influenza Virus Enigma,” 402–410.  
69 David M., Morens, Jeffery K. Taubenberger, and Anthony S. Fauci. “Predominant Role of Bacterial Pneumonia As a Cause of Death in 
Pandemic Influenza: Implications for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 198, no. 7 (2008): 962–970.  
70 Peter F. Wright, Kathryn B. Kirkland, and John F. Modlin, “When to Consider the Use of Antibiotics in the Treatment of 2009 H1N1 Influenza–
Associated Pneumonia,” New England Journal of Medicine 361, no. 24 (2009). 
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Kumaki et al.73 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Generics are 
affordable 
• Readily accessible 
• Familiar to care 
givers 
• Not virus-strain 
specific 
• Some key data linked 







Cinatl et al.74 
Katze et al.75 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Provide a treatment 
option if drug 
resistance issues to 
AVs arise 
• Effective against a 
wide range of 
influenza viruses 
• Expensive 
• Cold chain issues 
• Of the three types of 
interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) alpha 
primarily affects 
influenza viruses and 
beta affects HCo-Vs 
Known: Yes 
Experimental: No 
71 David S. Fedson, “Pandemic Influenza: A Potential Role for Statins in Treatment and Prophylaxis,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 43, no. 2 
(2006): 199–205; David S. Fedson, “Meeting the Challenge of Influenza Pandemic Preparedness in Developing Countries,” Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 15, no. 3 (2009): 365. 
72 Edward E. Walsh, “Statins and Influenza: Can We Move Forward?,” Journal of Infectious Diseases 205, no. 1 (2012): 1–3.  
73 Kumaki Yohichi, John D. Morrey, and Dale L. Barnard. “Effect of Statin Treatments on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1, Seasonal and 
H1N1pdm09 Virus Infections in BALB/c Mice,” Future Virology 7, no. 8 (2012): 801–818.  
74 J. Cinatl et al., “Treatment of SARS with Human Interferons,” The Lancet 362, no. 9380 (2003): 293–294. 
75 Michael G. Katze, Yupeng He, and Michael Gale, “Viruses and Interferon: A Fight for Supremacy,” Nature Reviews Immunology 2, no. 9 
(2002): 675–687.  
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Cinatl et al.76 
Katze et al.77 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Provide a treatment 
option if drug 
resistance issues to 
AVs arise 
• Effective against a 
wide range of 
viruses 
• Expensive 
• Cold chain issues 
• Of the three types of 
interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) only 
alpha affects 








Hensley et al.78 
Morgenstern et al.79 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Provide a treatment 
option if drug 
resistance issues to 
other AVs arise 
• Effective against 
HCo-V 
• Expensive 
• Cold chain issues 
• Of the three types of 
interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) beta 
impacts HCo-Vs 








Hensley et al.80 
Morgenstern et al.81 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Provide a treatment 
option if drug 
resistance issues to 
other AVs arise 
• Effective against 
HCo-V 
• Expensive 
• Cold chain issues 
• Of the three types of 
interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) beta 
impacts HCo-Vs 
 
• Small sample size of 
Known: Yes 
Experimental: Yes 
76 Cinatl et al., “Treatment of SARS with Human Interferons,” 293–294.  
77 Katze, He, and Gale, “Viruses and Interferon: A Fight for Supremacy,” 675–687.  
78 Lisa E. Hensley et al., “Interferon-β 1a and SARS Coronavirus Replication,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 10, no. 2 (2004): 317.  
79 Birgit Morgenstern, Martin Michaelis, Patrick C. Baer, Hans W. Doerr, and Jindrich Cinatl Jr. “Ribavirin and Interferon-β Synergistically Inhibit 
SARS-Associated Coronavirus Replication in Animal and Human Cell Lines,” Biochemical and Biophysical Research Communications 326, no. 4 
(2005): 905–908.  
80 Hensley et al., “Interferon-β 1a and SARS Coronavirus Replication,” 317.  
81 Morgenstern et al., “Ribavirin and Interferon-β Synergistically Inhibit SARS-Associated Coronavirus Replication in Animal and Human Cell 
Lines,” 905–908.  
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Pro: Bernard et al.83 
Neutral: 
Stockman et al.84 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Easily accessible 
• Familiar to 
clinicians & public 
health 
• Performed poorly 
against SARS 






Class: Herbal medicines 
Alleva et al.85 
Li et al.86 
Prophylaxis: No 
Treatment: Yes 
• Useful adjunct 
treatments 
• Targets the host 
response rather than 
the virus itself 
• Not FDA approved 




Oseltamivir + Relenza 




• Synergistic effect 
• Already in 
national/state 
stockpiles 
• Familiar to 
clinicians & public 
health 
• Easily stored long 
term 
• Possible drug 
resistance issues 








Combo-Therapy: Govorkova et al.89 Prophylaxis: Yes • Synergistic effect • Limits virus Known: Yes 
82 Yuji Oba, N. Lee, and J. Sung, “The Use of Corticosteroids in SARS.” N Engl J Med 348, no. 20 (2003): 2034–2035.  
83 Gordon R. Bernard et al., “High-Dose Corticosteroids in Patients with the Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 317, no. 25 (1987): 1565–1570.  
84 Lauren J. Stockman, Richard Bellamy, and Paul Garner, “SARS: Systematic Review of Treatment Effects,” PLoS medicine 3, no. 9 (2006): 
e343.  
85 Alleva, Cai, and Clark, “Using Complementary and Alternative Medicines to Target the Host Response During Severe Influenza,” 501–510. 
86 Shi-you Li et al., “Identification of Natural Compounds with Antiviral Activities Against SARS-Associated Coronavirus.” Antiviral Research 
67, no. 1 (2005): 18–23.  
87 Govorkova and Webster, “Combination Pharmaceutical Therapy for Influenza,” 1510–1529. 
88 Sailen Barik, “New Treatments for Influenza,” BioMed Central [BMC] Medicine 10, no. 1 (2012): 104.  
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Therapy Citations Uses Pros Cons Medical Efficacy 
Oseltamivir + Ribavirin Barik90 
 
Treatment: Yes • Easily stored long 
term 
replication, but has no 
impact on immune 
systems’ response 
• Ribavirin: causes 
hemolytic anemia in 
high doses, high 





Relenza + Ribavirin 
Govorkova et al.91 
Barik92 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes • Synergistic effect 
• Limits virus 
replication, but has no 
impact on immune 
systems’ response 
• Ribavirin: cause 
hemolytic anemia in 
high doses, high 






Peramivir + Ribavirin Govorkova et al.
93 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes • Synergistic effect 
• Limits virus 
replication, but has no 
impact on immune 
systems’ response 
• Peramivir is approved 




(Peramivir is in Phase II 
trials) 






                                                 
Therapy Citations Uses Pros Cons Medical Efficacy 
Combo-Therapy: 
Amantadine + Ribavirin 




• Enhanced inhibitory 
effect 
• Synergistic effect 
• Limits virus 
replication, but has no 
impact on immune 
systems’ response 
• Amantadine has been 
identified to have 





Antivirals + Statins 




• Addresses virus 
replication issues 
and immune system 
hyper response 
issues concurrently 
• Some AVs already 
in state/federal 
stockpiles 
• Statins are easily 
accessible and 
familiar to clinicians 
• Still being researched 
and tested 
• Small sample size in 
some studies 









                                                 
Therapy Citations Uses Pros Cons Medical Efficacy 
Combo-Therapy: 
Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, 
PegIntron/Rebetol Combo 
Pack 
Falzarano et al.98 
Prophylaxis: Yes 
Treatment: Yes 
• Synergistic effect 
• Proven to have an 
effect against novel 
viruses 
• Provides another Tx 
option during 
pandemics 
• Each component is 
commonly used in 
clinic settings 
• Comes as an injectable 
medication only 
• From SARS: “May 
improve outcome, but 
a definitive treatment 






98 Darryl Falzarano et al., “Inhibition of Novel β Coronavirus Replication by a Combination of Interferon-α2b and Ribavirin,” Scientific Reports 3 
(2013). 
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In Table V in the next chapter, each of these possible options is screened against 




In the face of so much literature on such a timely national and international 
discussion, what treatment options do states, such as Nevada, have in the face of what 
appear to be more frequent (and more threatening) pandemics involving novel viruses? 
Even within the divergent points of view that this research revealed (as well as within 
those six classes of therapies discussed in the previous section), varying 
recommendations are provided on if these therapies should be used as a treatment, as a 
post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), or as a combination of the two. This chapter then 
focuses on attempting to untangle some of these recommendations, as well as to find a 
possible solution that could potentially work for a state, such as Nevada, in its 
preparations for emerging threats involving novel viruses. 
A.  VIRAL VERSUS BACTERIAL PNEUMONIA 
In the aftermath of global pandemics involving novel viruses, science has 
explained how these viruses penetrate deep within the human lung and cause significant 
infection, commonly referred to as pneumonia. The infection of pneumonia to the human 
body comes in two varieties, viral pneumonia and bacterial pneumonia. Although 
treatment options were not available in 1918–1919 to counter the effects of either type of 
pneumonia, detailed records (particularly from the U.S. Army) provide epidemiological 
data quantifying the number of soldiers and civilians who succumbed to bacterial versus 
viral pneumonia, or in the parlance of the time, bronchopneumonia versus lobar 
pneumonia, respectively.99 For those who have made the study of pandemic influenza 
their work, large sources of data support the idea that the majority of deaths attributed to 
pandemic influenza are caused by viral pneumonia versus bacterial pneumonia, and vice 
versa. One quote that stands out in support of bacterial pneumonias as the primary cause 
99 M. W. Ireland [Surgeon General of the U.S. Army] and Joseph F. Siler, The Medical Department of 
the United States Army in the World War, Volume IX, Communicable and Other Diseases (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928), 68, (n.d.), http://ia700303.us.archive.org/13/items/WW1 
ArmyMedDeptHistV9/WW1ArmyMedDeptHistV9.PDF; John F. Brundage and G. Dennis Shanks, 
“Deaths from Bacterial Pneumonia During 1918–19 Influenza Pandemic,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 
14, no. 8 (2008): 1193. 
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of death comes from French author, Louis Cruveilhier, in 1919, as he described this 
interplay of influenza virus infection (or as it is called in French: la grippe) and 
secondary infections caused by opportunistic bacteria that enter the human body: “If 
grippe condemns, the secondary infections execute.”100 Picking up from where Monsieur 
Cruveilhier left off, many highly respected American researchers would also state that 
opportunistic bacterial pneumonias are the predominant cause of fatality amongst patients 
suffering from a pandemic strain influenza virus.101 In his book The Great Influenza, 
author John Barry discusses these findings by the Army’s Surgeon General and their 
implications for today. He writes that the report: 
… overstates the proportion of victims who died from Acute Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome (author’s note: this is referred to as ARDS, which is a 
consequence of the cytokine storm within a human body)—in effect from 
influenzal viral pneumonia—because the army study looked only at deaths 
among soldiers, men who were young and otherwise healthy, the group 
most likely to have been killed by their own immune systems. In the total 
population, viral pneumonia and ARDS would not account for as high a 
percentage of the deaths. Most deaths almost certainly did come from 
secondary bacterial infections, but probably not quite so many as has been 
assumed. That should, however, be small comfort for those worry about 
the next influenza pandemic.102 
For those who serve within state/local level public health agencies, and are paid to 
“worry about the next influenza pandemic,” it is the point made by Mr. Barry concerning 
the “total population” that is of concern, it will be necessary to plan for how to handle 
both viral pneumonia cases, and bacterial pneumonia cases. In preparation for large-scale 
biological event, the United States has invested significant time/energy/resources in 
establishing a strategic national stockpile (SNS). As a result of these preparations, state- 
and county-level health departments have prepared detailed plans on how they would 
request, receive, and distribute those federal resources in time of need. A large proportion 
of the SNS is comprised of antibiotics and antivirals; thus, from a planning perspective, 
100 L. Cruveilhier, Action du sérum antipneumococcique au cours de la pneumonie et dans les 
complications de la grippe, Annals de l’Institut Pasteur 33 (1919): 448.  
101 Morens, Taubenberger, and Fauci, “Predominant Role of Bacterial Pneumonia As a Cause of 
Death in Pandemic Influenza,” 962–970. 
102 Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, 252.  
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state and local public health agencies would likely have access to this national asset that 
could assist them with bacterial pneumonia cases by providing the requisite antibiotics. 
When combining the stockpiles of these life saving medications with the existing state 
stockpiles of antivirals discussed previously in this thesis (at both the state and federal 
levels of government), then state and local health agencies are much better prepared to 
meet the challenge of treating viral and/or bacterial pneumonia caused by a pandemic 
strain of virus than this nation’s forefathers were in 1918. However, as useful as existing 
stockpiles may be in treating or preventing bacterial pneumonia cases, public health and 
its healthcare partners must still be prepared to treat and prevent cases of viral pneumonia 
as well.  
B.  CALCULATING THE GROSS ATTACK RATE, HOSPITALIZATION 
RATE, AND MORTALITY RATE ASSOCIATED WITH A PANDEMIC 
STRAIN VIRUS 
From a state planning perspective, what are the numbers that should be 
anticipated when preparing for a pandemic involving a novel virus? In the spring of 2013 
(following the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health’s activation of its 
planning section for a potential MERS-CoV and/or H7N9 type-A influenza response) the 
following questions were posed by the state health officer to the state planning section 
chief.  
• How many Nevadan’s are expected to fall clinically ill from a novel 
influenza virus (known within public health as the “Gross Attack Rate” or 
GAR)? 
o As per the CDC’s FluAid 2.0 website, clinical illness is defined as a 
case of influenza that causes some measureable economic impact, such 
as one-half day of work lost or a visit to a physician’s office103 
• Of those people who fall clinically ill, how many would require 
hospitalization (known within public health as the “hospitalization rate”)?  
• Of those people who fall clinically ill, how many would lose their lives 
from the illness (known within public health as the “Mortality Rate”)?  
103 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “FluAid 2.0 Pandemic Influenza Planning 
Resources,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/fluaid.htm. 
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Fortunately, for state and local public health planners, researchers at the CDC 
have provided a useful tool to assist in these calculations by providing national estimates 
for various rates, via the CDC’s FluAid 2.0 downloadable software.104 In an effort to 
answer the state health officer’s three questions in the spring of 2013, that software was 
used to calculate these three rates using the following steps.  
 
• Step One: establish what the state of Nevada’s total population would be, 
based off the most recent estimates by the state demographer’s office. In 
Nevada, that estimated number for 2013 is 2,775,216 (as of October 1, 
2013).105 This state demographer’s report also splits these total population 
data into three age ranges as follows: 
0 to 19 year olds:  766,414  (27.6% of the state population) 
20 to 64 year olds:  1,656,765  (59.7% of the state population) 
65+ year olds:  352,038  (12.7% of the state population) 
TOTAL:  2,775,216  (100% of the state population) 
Note to Reader: Please keep these three numbers (e.g., 766K, 1.6M, and 352K) in mind as they will later be 
used in Step #3  
 
• Step Two: involves using the CDC software’s three GAR ranges listed on 
page seven of nine on the FluAid 2.0 software. The system instructs 
planners to calculate for a “lowest” GAR of 15%, a “middle” GAR of 
25%, and a “highest” GAR of 35% for a severe strain virus.106 When 
these three GAR estimates are applied to the state population of 2,775,216, 
the following range of gross attack rates are calculated:  
15% of 2,775,216  = approximately 416,200 Nevadans may fall ill 
25% of 2,775,216  = approximately 693,800 Nevadans may fall ill 
35% of 2,775,216  = approximately 971,300 Nevadans may fall ill 
 
 
104 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “FluAid 2.0 Pandemic Influenza Planning 
Resources.” 
105 Jeff Hardcastle, “Nevada County Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin Estimates and Projections 
2000 to 2032: Estimates from 2000 to 2012 and Projections from 2013 to 2032,” The Nevada State 
Demographer’s Office, 5, http://nvdemography.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Nevada-Summary-
Workbook-ASRHO-Estimates-and-Projections-2000-to-2032.pdf. 
106 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “FluAid 2.0: Estimating State Level Impact of 
Pandemic Influenza–[Gross Attack Rates], Seven of Nine,” http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources 
/tools/fluaid.htm. 
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• Step Three: calculate the hospitalization rate, which is more challenging to 
discern for two reasons, 1) the Nevada state demographer’s data covers an 
age range of zero to 19 years (0 to 19); whereas, the CDC FluAid 2.0 
software employs an age range of zero to 18 (0 to 18), and 2) the CDC’s 
software splits its calculations for this rate into two sub-categories (high 
risk and non-high risk), then goes on to split those into three sub-tiers of 
risk (minimum, mean, and maximum). Table 2 lists the FluAid 2.0 
estimates for hospitalization rates (listed as rates per 1,000 population of 
an age range-specific population) as they would appear for any state using 
this software as a planning tool. 
Table 2.   Hospitalization Rate Estimates for Nevada during a Pandemic  
High Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs 2.1% 2.9% 9% 
19–64 yrs 0.83% 2.99% 5.14% 
65+ yrs 4% 8.5% 13% 
Non High Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs 0.2% 0.5% 2.9% 
19–64 yrs 0.18% 1.46% 2.75% 
65+ yrs 1.5% 2.25% 3% 
Note 1: Default values are national estimates 
Note 2: Hospitalization rates per 1,000 population by age and risk group 
 
For the first issue of the demographer’s age range versus that of the CDC’s 
software, the state data’s age range of “0 to 19 year olds” will be inserted into the CDC’s 
age range of “0 to 18 year olds.” This decision is based on the fact that the hospitalization 
rate calculations required for this thesis are macro in nature; thus, little benefit is to be 
gained by splitting out the 19-year olds from the age group used for the state data. 
This second issue of the FluAid 2.0 software splitting the population into two sub-
categories (high risk and non-high risk), and then further splitting those into sub-tiers, 
presents some challenges for state planners. First, if it is known how many people are in 
each age group, then would it be possible to calculate how many of those people would 
be considered “high risk” versus “non-high risk?” This is a challenging question for 
many reasons, and one that has confounded many scientists who have confronted these 
types of planning scenarios. Fortunately, for state-level planners, the CDC has helped 
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provide some answers to these questions (as well as guidance), most notably from an 
article published in 1999 by Meltzer, Cox and Fukuda.107  
As per the CDC’s FluAid 2.0 website, this article was published to provide “a 
range of national estimates of the number of deaths, hospitalizations, outpatient visits, 
and those who will become ill but not seek medical care.”108 The estimates included 
within the Meltzer et al. article serve as a foundation for the CDC’s FluAid 2.0 software, 
which in turn helps provide state planners with national estimates as to how many people 
within each age group would be considered high risk versus non-high risk during a 
pandemic. Table 1 of the Meltzer et al., article provides the following estimates for the 
United States.109  
Table 3.   Estimate of Age Distribution of Cases and Percentage of Population at High 
Risk Used to Examine the Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United 
States 
Age Group (yrs) Percentage of all casesa 
0–19 40.0 
20–64 53.1 
65+   6.8 
Totalsb 100.0 
 Percentage at high riskc 
0–19   6.4 
20–64 14.4 
65+ 40.0 
U.S. averaged 15.4 
aThe actual number of cases will depend upon the assumed gross attack rate. The distribution of cases was 
based on lower and upper estimates of age-specific attack rates from the 1918, 1928–29, and 1957 
epidemics and pandemics. 
bTotals do not add to exactly 100% because of rounding. 
107 Meltzer, Cox, and Fukuda, “The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United States: 
Priorities for Intervention,” 659–671.  
108 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Seasonal Influenza (Flu),” (n.d.), 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/fluaid.htm. 
109 Meltzer, Cox, and Fukuda, “The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United States: 
Priorities for Intervention,” 660. 
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cPersons are categorized at high risk if they have a preexisting medical condition that makes them more 
susceptible to influenza-related complications. The percentages of age groups at high risk were obtained 
from the Working Group on Influenza Pandemic Preparedness (GrIPPE, unpub. data). The Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices estimates that 27 to 31 million persons aged <65 years are at high 
risk for influenza-associated complications. 
dAverage is an age-weighted average, using each age group’s proportion of the total U.S. population. 
Although those three estimates for high risk are intended to provide a U.S. 
average, they are nonetheless useful for state planners as well. In the case of Nevada, 
each of those percentages can be multiplied by its corresponding age category 
populations, and thus, yield the following results. 
 
6.4% of Nevada’s 0 to 19 year olds (766,414) would be considered “High Risk”   =   49,000 
14.4% of Nevada’s 20 to 64 year olds (1,656,765) would be considered “High Risk”  = 238,500 
40% of Nevada’s 65+ year olds (352,038) would be considered “High Risk”   =  140,800 
Total Number of Nevadans who would be considered ‘High Risk’     = 428,300 
Table 4 employs the FluAid 2.0 national estimates for hospitalization rates (listed 
as rates per 1,000 population of an age range-specific population) as they would appear 
for the state of Nevada on page five of nine of FluAid 2.0’s software, under the title of 
“Estimating State Level Impact of Pandemic Influenza–[Hospitalization].” 
Table 4.   Hospitalization Rate Calculations for Nevada during a Pandemic 
High Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs 2.1% of 49K = 103 2.9% of 49K = 142 9% of 49K = 441 
19–64 yrs .83% of 238.5K = 198 2.99% of 238.5K = 713 5.14% of 238.5K = 1,226 
65+ yrs 4% of 140.8K = 563 8.5% of 140.8K = 1,197 13% of 140.8K = 1,830 
Non High Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs .2% of 766K = 153 .5% of 766K= 383 2.9% of 766K= 2,221 
19–64 yrs .18% of 1.66M= 300 1.47% of 1.66M= 2,440 2.75% of 1.66M= 4,565 
65+ yrs 1.5% of 352K = 528 2.25% of 352K= 792 3% of 352K= 1,056 
Totals by Age 
Range Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs 103 + 153 = 256 142 + 383 = 525 441 + 2,221 = 2,662 
19–64 yrs 198 + 300 = 498 713 + 2,440 = 3,153 1,226 + 4,565 = 5,791 
65+ yrs 563 + 528 = 1,091 1,197 + 792 = 1,989 1,830 + 1,056 = 2,886 
Totals for All 
Ages Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–65+ yrs 256+498+1,091 = 1,845 hospitalizations 




Note 1: Default values are national estimates 
Note 2: Hospitalization rates per 1,000 population by age and risk group 
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• Step Four: calculate the mortality rate, which follows the same 
methodology used in the hospitalization rate calculations described above. 
Table 5 employs the FluAid 2.0 national estimates for mortality (aka 
death) rates (listed as rates per 1,000 population of an age range-specific 
population) as they would appear for the state of Nevada on page four of 
nine under “Estimating State Level Impact of Pandemic Influenza–
[Deaths].”  
Table 5.   Mortality Rate Calculations for Nevada during a Pandemic 
High Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs .126% of 49K = 6 .22% of 49K = 11 7.65% of 49K = 375 
19–64 yrs .1% of 238.5K = 24 2.91% of 238.5K = 694 5.72% of 238.5K = 1,364 
65+ yrs 2.76% of 140.8K = 389 4.195% of 140.8K = 590 5.63% of 140.8K = 793 
Non High 
Risk Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs .014% of 766K = 11 .024% of 766K = 18 .125% of 766K = 96 
19–64 yrs .025% of 1.6M = 40 .037% of 1.6M = 59 .09% of 1.6M = 144 
65+ yrs .28% of 352K = 99 .42% of 352K = 148 .54% of 352K = 190 
Totals by 
Age Range Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–18 yrs 6 + 11 = 17 11 + 18 = 29 375 + 96 = 471 
19–64 yrs 24 + 40 = 64 694 + 59 = 753 1,364 + 144 = 1,508 
65+ yrs 389 + 99 = 488 590 + 148 = 738 793 + 190 = 983 
Totals for All 
Ages Minimum Mean (Most Likely) Maximum 
0–65+ 17+64+488 = 569 excess deaths 
29+753+738 = 1,520 
excess deaths 
471+1,508+983 = 2,962 
excess deaths 
Note 1: Default values are national estimates 
Note 2: Mortality rates per 1,000 population by age and risk group 
 
C. EMPLOYING RATE CALCULATIONS TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF 
A STATE STOCKPILE 
The previous section of this chapter described the process of how a state-level 
PHP program could possibly calculate the gross attack rate, the hospitalization rate, and 
the mortality rate associated with a pandemic. Although this thesis addresses pandemics 
involving novel type-A influenzas, or novel human coronaviruses (HCo-V), the CDC 
FluAid 2.0 software used in the previous section is specific for pandemic influenzas only. 
Without any such companion software system focused on a novel HCo-V, the estimates 
generated by the FluAid 2.0 software for influenza pandemics will have to substitute for 
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pandemics involving a novel HCo-V, as well. This is based off of the planning 
assumption that estimates generated for influenza pandemic planning would be similar 
with those needed for a pandemic involving a novel HCo-V. 
Thus, of the three rates calculated in the previous section, which of those should 
be used to calculate the quantity of a drug therapy to be purchased to create (or 
supplement) a state stockpile (assuming this thesis finds such a therapy or therapies)? The 
GAR provides an idea of the total number of people who may fall ill from a novel virus, 
but as with any virus (novel or otherwise) the range of “illness” can span anything from 
“barely noticeable” to “life threatening.” This disparity in range can be attributed to 
epidemiological factors, such as dose exposure, route of exposure, and underlying 
morbidities (e.g., asthma, pregnancy, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
etc.). Although the GAR is a useful planning tool, it may include too large a segment of 
the population to be of any real use. 
The hospitalization rate calculation narrows the focus from those rather large 
numbers provided in the GAR calculations in step one of the previous section, for 
example: 15% of Nevadans (a.k.a. 416,200 people) may fall ill, etc. Of the people who 
fall ill, most interest would be focused on providing potentially life-saving medications to 
those who are ill enough to require hospitalization. While an underestimate of those 
seeking treatment, but given the limited response capabilities projected, it would not be 
unreasonable to restrict treatment to this group. 
The mortality rate calculations are useful in that they describe how many people 
could be lost if nothing is done. From a state-level planning perspective, they are helpful, 
but perhaps too narrow. They describe a possible result of infection, in this case death, 
that is hoped to be avoided. As with any drug therapy, it would be necessary to introduce 
these interventions prior to a patient’s death; thus, from a planning perspective, perhaps 
this rate is too narrow and too late in the progression of disease. 
Therefore, of the three rate calculations described above (GAR, hospitalization, 
mortality), which should be used to help guide the decision-making process for how 
much of a drug therapy should be purchased? The hospitalization rate calculations have 
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been selected for use in determining the quantity of a therapy Nevada should purchase 
(assuming one is identified later in this thesis). This rate calculation was chosen for this 
research because it offers a wide enough aperture through which to guide state-level 
planning estimates, and it assumes that patients who are ill enough to be hospitalized will 
be in a clinical environment whereby potential drug therapies may be administered 
properly. In other words, should this thesis identify a possible drug therapy that works 
very well, yet needs to be administered through an intravenous line (IV), then that may be 
of little help to patients who are ill, but remain at home, and have no one to open and 
maintain an IV line for them. 
The hospitalization rate calculation also provides a range (e.g., minimum, mean, 
and maximum) for state-level planners to choose from: minimum is 1,845, mean is 5,667, 
and, maximum is 11,339. This range provides some latitude for public health leadership 
when its decides on how and where to spend decreasing budget dollars on a possible state 
stockpile of new drug therapies.  
D. OVERVIEW OF THE SIX CLASSES OF DRUG THERAPIES 
For the non-public health disciplines reading this thesis, a brief explanation of 
each class of medications may be necessary, as well as a brief description of the benefit 
provided during a pandemic response.  
1. Antiviral Medications 
The following is a brief explanation of what antivirals are and how they impact a 
virus’ ability to enter or exit a host cell. When an invading virus approaches a possible 
host cell, it needs a “key” to enter the host cell’s outer wall. This process is achieved by a 
protein on the virus’ surface called hemagglutinin; or as the reader may be more familiar 
with, H (a.k.a. HA). Influenza viruses have 16 of these H proteins on their surface; thus, 
from the virus’ perspective, they have 16 possible “keys” to try upon the host cell’s outer 
wall. In essence, the virus sticks each of these 16 “keys” into receptor sites on the host 
cell’s outer wall one at a time. If the correct “key” is matched to the correct “keyhole,” 
then the virus is allowed to open and pass through the cell’s outer wall. Once that 
happens, the invading virus then hijacks the host cell’s replication system and makes 
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thousands (to millions) of copies of itself, which usually results in the host cell’s death. 
When that process is complete, those new copies of the virus once again need to pass 
through the outer wall of the host virus, except this time, they need to go from the inside 
of the cell to the outside of the cell. To achieve that goal, each virus has another set of 
surface proteins called neuraminidase, or as the reader may be more familiar with, N 
(a.k.a NA). Influenza viruses have 9 of these N proteins on their surface; thus, from their 
perspective, they have nine possible “keys” to try from within the host cell’s outer wall. 
When the CDC or WHO is heard discussing an influenza as “H5N1,” they are basically 
talking about that specific influenza virus’ need to fit the fifth (H5) “key” to enter a host 
cell, and the first (N1) “key” to exit that host cell.  
Antivirals work by either blocking some or all of the 16 H “keyholes” (a.k.a. 
hemagglutinin inhibitors), or some or all of the nine neuraminidase “keyholes” (a.k.a. 
neuraminidase inhibitors). This process helps to limit virus replication (as was briefly 
discussed previously in this thesis), and thus, lowering, or nearly cancelling, host cell 
infection. The current stockpiles of Oseltamivir/Tamiflu and Zanamivir/Relenza are good 
examples of neuraminidase inhibitors (that work against both type-A and type-B 
influenza viruses).110 Antivirals often need to be matched to a specific strain of virus, and 
do not offer permanent protection (a.k.a. immunity) if taken as a prophylaxis (e.g., taken 
by a person who was exposed but not yet demonstrating any symptoms of illness). This 
concept has been a key message used by public health educators in explaining these 
features of antivirals to both the public, and to public health’s response partners. 
2.  Antibiotic Medications 
Antibiotic medications were discovered accidentally in 1928 by Scottish biologist, 
Sir Alexander Fleming, when glass plates he had used for experiments developed a mold. 
Dr. Fleming noticed that bacteria near the edges of the mold had died off. Further 
analysis revealed a bacteria-killing substance within the mold later identified as 
penicillin. This discovery, and the new class of drugs it introduced, helped to both 
110 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Influenza Antiviral Medications: Summary 
for Clinicians,” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/antivirals/summary-clinicians.htm. 
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revolutionize and transform all of medicine. This advance is due to the fact that 
antibiotics helped to provide the first real tool against bacterial infection. Age-old 
bacterial foes, such as plague, etc., were brought under control by this “wonder drug” as 
it was initially called. Although antibiotics have no effect upon viruses, they remain a 
useful tool for both clinicians and public health officials in countering opportunistic 
bacterial infections. Unfortunately, some bacteria have developed resistance to certain 
antibiotics, and thus, create a threat to global public health.111 Although it has no impact 
on virus replication, nor suppression of the body’s immune response, this class of drugs 
does have a drastic effect on bacterial infections that often accompany viral infections 
associated with novel and pandemic strain viruses. As Morens et al. describe in their 
article about the 1918 influenza pandemic:  
Many excess deaths in the 1918 pandemic resulted from a disease process 
that began with a severe viral infection that spread cell-to-cell down the 
respiratory tract, causing severe tissue damage but normally followed by 
prompt tissue repair unless secondary bacterial invasion ensued. The 
bronchial tree appeared to be the primary organ of involvement in severe 
1918 influenza cases; when bacterial invaders in the nasopharynx gained 
access to the peripheral bronchial tree by direct extension along denuded 
bronchial epithelium, bronchopneumonia could then occur.112 
3.  Statin Medications 
Most would recognize statins for their traditional role in lowering cholesterol in 
the bloodstream. Many would have probably heard of certain brand names for statins, 
such as Pfizer’s Lipitor or Crestor by AstraZeneca, just to name a few. In addition to their 
ability to lower cholesterol, statins also have both an anti-inflammatory and an immune-
modulatory effect. It is these additional benefits to the use of statins that authors like 
111 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Antibiotics Aren’t Always the Answer,” 
(n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/Features/GetSmart/; Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], “Hunting the 
Nightmare Bacteria, Frontline PBS, October 22, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/hunting-
the-nightmare-bacteria/. 
112 David M. Morens et al., “The 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Lessons for 2009 and the Future,” Critical 
Care Medicine 38, no. 4 suppl. (2010): e10.  
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Fedson, Vandermeer, and Walsh discuss in relation to pandemic strain influenzas.113 
Statins do not impact virus replication, yet they do help to suppress the body’s immune 
response. As a class of drugs, they are familiar to medical providers, come in plentiful 
supply, are affordable, and are easily stored long term, thus making each of these traits an 
appealing prospect for a state-level stockpile. 
4.  Interferon Medications 
Although interferons would technically be listed as antivirals, they have been 
separated from that class listed above because their mode of action is so different. These 
naturally-occurring proteins are made and secreted by the cells of the body’s immune 
system, they are a major type of cytokine, and come in three classes: alpha (helps to treat 
cancers and viral infections), beta (helps to treat multiple sclerosis), and gamma (helps 
for treating chronic granulomatous disease).114 Each of these three classes has their own 
individual effects, as well as overlapping effects, which the MedicineNet.com website 
describes as, “the mechanism of action of interferon is complex and is not well 
understood.” This class of medications helps to modulate the body’s immune system 
response to challenges from viruses, bacteria, cancers, and foreign substances that impact 
the body.115 Although interferon alphas do not directly kill viruses, they do help to boost 
the body’s immune system, and to prevent a hyper response by that system.116 More 
commonly discussed as a treatment for diseases, such as leukemia, AIDS-related 
Kaposi’s sarcoma, chronic hepatitis B and C, the literature review for this thesis 
generated a large amount of information about using interferon to enhance the body’s 
113 Fedson, “Pandemic Influenza: A Potential Role for Statins in Treatment and Prophylaxis,” 199–
205; Meredith L. Vandermeer et al., “Association Between Use of Statins and Mortality Among Patients 
Hospitalized with Laboratory-Confirmed Influenza Virus Infections: A Multistate Study,” Journal of 
Infectious Diseases 205, no. 1 (2012): 13–19; Walsh, “Statins and Influenza: Can We Move Forward?,” 1–
3. 




                                                 
immune system against pandemic strain influenzas, as well as novel HCo-Vs (specifically 
interferon-α2b).117  
5.  Corticosteroid Medications 
This class of medication is similar to the natural hormones produced within 
bodies that help to control many important functions, such as blood sugar levels, salt 
levels, as well as the immune system’s function.118 These medications are often used to 
help treat diseases that cause inflammation, as novel viruses would most likely cause 
within the human lung following infection.119 This class of medication works by 
blocking substances within the human body that cause swelling. During the 2003–2004 
SARS epidemic, these medications fell out of favor because it suppressed the entire 
immune system; both the good and the bad components of that system’s response. 
6.  Herbal/Alternate Medications 
The literature often describes these medications as being “complementary” and 
“anti-inflammatory” in nature; with their effects primarily targeted on the host response 
rather than the virus replication.120 The Alleva et al. article includes a long list of Chinese 
herbs often described as “adjunct treatment therapies” to antivirals. Although these herbal 
medications are not currently licensed within the United States, they do warrant further 
research and analysis. 
E. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS GENERATED BY THESIS RESEARCH 
With such a wide field of possible treatment therapies discussed throughout the 
literature, which of these could potentially fit within the three criteria employed for this 
thesis: medical efficacy; cost; and, logistical considerations? In this final section to the 
117 Falzarano et al., “Inhibition of Novel β Coronavirus Replication by a Combination of Interferon-
α2b and Ribavirin.” 
118 A. C. Poinier and S. M. Shoor, “Corticosteroids,” WebMD, May 7, 2010, http://www.webmd.com/ 
hw-popup/corticosteroids. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Alleva, Cai, and Clark, “Using Complementary and Alternative Medicines to Target the Host 
Response During Severe Influenza,” 501–510. 
 46 
                                                 
analysis chapter, each of the therapies listed in the methods chapter will be screened 
against these three criteria. In Table 6, the columns are intended to walk the reader 
through a brief overview of each therapy’s ability to meet each of the three criteria. The 
“Medical Efficacy” column will provide a simple “yes” or “no” synopsis of what the 
literature describes for that specific therapy’s ability to: 1) reduce virus replication (listed 
as ↓ Virus Rep. in the table), 2) reduce the body’s immune response (listed as ↓ Imm. 
Res. in the table), or 3) have some other effect (e.g., treat secondary infections, etc., listed 
as other in the table). The “cost” column will begin by employing the three 
hospitalization rates calculated previously in this chapter (e.g., minimum of 1,845, mean 
of 5,667, and maximum of 11,339), and then multiply each of those by the price listed 
within the GoodRx website for that specific therapy. Since these calculations are for 
strains of virus that may not yet even exist, it is a challenge to forecast a specific 
treatment regimen (e.g., two 40mg pills per day for 10 days, etc.). In those instances 
when the GoodRx website does not provide a specific multiday regimen, a generic “one 
pill/capsule per day for 10 days” treatment regimen will be substituted to allow the 
website’s required data fields to be populated with a value. The choice of using a 10-day 
regimen also helps keep the calculations simple. The column listed as “logistical 
considerations” will describe if a therapy can be held in a warehouse as bulk storage, with 
no special temperature considerations other than a climate-controlled space (listed as bulk 
store in the table), or if it will require refrigeration (listed as cold chain in the table). The 
“citations” column will provide any specific information on where cost estimates were 
obtained. The final column, listed as a question, will provide the simple “yes” or “no” as 
to if a specified therapy could be used to build (or supplement) a state-level stockpile. 
Examples of what could exclude a candidate therapy would be expense (e.g., more than 
1% of the state’s annual PHP budget), a cold chain requirement (the state can only handle 
bulk storage in a climate-controlled warehouse, not in large refrigerators, etc.), or the 
proposed therapy is already included and widely available through the SNS. 
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Table 6.   Candidate Therapy Selection 
Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 




↓ Virus Rep.: Yes 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
Tamiflu brand name, 
dose pack of 10 
capsules of 75mg each 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens121 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens122 








↓ Virus Rep: Yes 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
relenza brand name, 
inhaler, 5mg each 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens of 
inhalers124 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens of 
No 
121 GoodRx.com, “Tamiflu,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/tamiflu/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Tamiflu&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=10+capsules+of+75mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=1845&language=&store-chain=. 
122 GoodRx.com, “Tamiflu,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/tamiflu/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Tamiflu&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=10+capsules+of+75mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=5667&language=&store-chain=. 
123 GoodRx.com, “Tamiflu,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/tamiflu/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Tamiflu&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=10+capsules+of+75mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=11339&language=&store-chain=. 
124 GoodRx.com, “Relenza,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/relenza/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Relenza&form=inhaler 
&strength=5mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=1845&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
inhalers125 







↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $3,250. 
5,667 = $9,960. 
11,339 = $19,900. 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, 
capsules of 100mg 
each, one cap. per day 
for ten days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens127 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens128 




125 GoodRx.com, “Relenza,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/relenza/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Relenza&form= 
inhaler&strength=5mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=5667&language=&store-chain=. 
126 GoodRx.com, “Relenza,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/relenza/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Relenza&form= 
inhaler&strength=5mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=11339&language=&store-chain=. 
127 GoodRx.com, “Amantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amantadine& 
form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=1845&language=&store-chain=. 
128 GoodRx.com, “Amantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amantadine& 
form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=5667&language=&store-chain=. 
129 GoodRx.com, “Amantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amantadine& 
form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=11339&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 




↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $52K 
5,667 = $161K 
11,339 = $321K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, tablets 
of 100mg each, one 
tablet per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens130 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens131 






(nucleoside antimetabolite drug) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, 
capsules of 200mg 
each, one cap. per day 
for ten days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens133 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens134 
Yes 
130 GoodRx.com, “Rimantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rimantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=rimantadine& 
form=tablet&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
131 GoodRx.com, “Rimantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rimantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=rimantadine& 
form=tablet&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
132 GoodRx.com, “Rimantadine,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rimantadine/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=rimantadine& 
form=tablet&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
133 GoodRx.com, “Ribavirin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/ribavirin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ribavirin&form= 
capsule&strength=200mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
134 GoodRx.com, “Ribavirin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/ribavirin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ribavirin&form= 
capsule&strength=200mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 






↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 






Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, tablet 
of 500mg each, one 
tablet per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens136 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens137 






Tetracycline Class: Doxycycline 
hyclate 
↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 






Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, 
capsule of 100mg each, 
one cap. per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens139 
No 
135 GoodRx.com, “Ribavirin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/ribavirin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ribavirin&form= 
capsule&strength=200mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
136 GoodRx.com, “Cipro,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/cipro/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ciprofloxacin&form= 
tablet&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
137 GoodRx.com, “Cipro,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/cipro/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ciprofloxacin&form= 
tablet&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
138 GoodRx.com, “Cipro,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/cipro/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=ciprofloxacin&form= 
tablet&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
139 GoodRx.com, “Doxycycline Hyclate,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/doxycycline-hyclate/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=& 
label=doxycycline+hyclate&form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens140 







↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 






Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, 
capsule of 500mg each, 
one cap. per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens142 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens143 




140 GoodRx.com, “Doxycycline Hyclate,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/doxycycline-hyclate/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&l 
abel=doxycycline+hyclate&form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
141 GoodRx.com, “Doxycycline Hyclate,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/doxycycline-hyclate/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=& 
label=doxycycline+hyclate&form=capsule&strength=100mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
142 GoodRx.com, “Amoxicillin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amoxicillin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amoxicillin& 
form=capsule&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
143 GoodRx.com, “Amoxicillin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amoxicillin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amoxicillin& 
form=capsule&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
144 GoodRx.com, “Amoxicillin,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/amoxicillin/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=amoxicillin& 
form=capsule&strength=500mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 




↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845= $8.8K 
5,667 = $27K 
11,339 = $55K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, tablet 
of 40mg each, one 
tablet per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens145 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens146 







↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $105K 
5,667 = $322K 
11,339 = $645K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
brand name only avail., 
tablet of 40mg each, 
one tablet per day for 
ten days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens148 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens149 
No 
145 GoodRx.com, “Lipitor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lipitor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=atorvastatin&formtablet 
&strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
146 GoodRx.com, “Lipitor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lipitor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=atorvastatin&form=tablet 
&strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
147 GoodRx.com, “Lipitor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lipitor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=atorvastatin&form=tablet 
&strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
148 GoodRx.com, “Crestor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/crestor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Crestor&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
149 GoodRx.com, “Crestor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/crestor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Crestor&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 






↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $2K 
5,667 = $6K 
11,339 = $12K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, tablet 
of 40mg each, one 
tablet per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens151 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens152 







↓ Virus Rep: No 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $4K 
5,667 = $12.4K 
11,339 = $25K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, tablet 
of 600mg each, one 






150 GoodRx.com, “Crestor” n.d., http://www.goodrx.com/crestor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=Crestor&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
151 GoodRx.com, “Zocor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/zocor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=simvastatin&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
152 GoodRx.com, “Zocor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/zocor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=simvastatin&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
153 GoodRx.com, “Zocor,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/zocor/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=simvastatin&form=tablet& 
strength=40mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens154 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens155 






↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
brand name only avail., 
vial of 1ml of 10miu, 
one vial per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens157 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens158 
Price quote for 
No 
154 GoodRx.com, “Lopid,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lopid/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=gemfibrozil&form=tablet& 
strength=600mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
155 GoodRx.com, “Lopid,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lopid/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=gemfibrozil&form= 
tablet&strength=600mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
156 GoodRx.com, “Lopid,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/lopid/price#/?distance=13&filter-location=&coords=&label=gemfibrozil&form= 
tablet&strength=600mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
157 GoodRx.com, “Intron A,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/intron-a/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Intron+A&form= 
vial&strength=1ml+of+10miu&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
158 GoodRx.com, “Intron A,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/intron-a/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Intron+A&form= 
vial&strength=1ml+of+10miu&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 






↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: No 
Cold Chain: Yes 
GoodRx.com used, 
brand name only avail., 
vials of 150mcg/0.5ml, 
one vial per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens160  
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens161 







↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: No 
Cold Chain: Yes 
GoodRx.com used, 
brand name only avail., 
vial of 30mcg/0.5ml, 
one vial per day for ten 
days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens163 
No 
159 GoodRx.com, “Intron A,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/intron-a/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Intron+A&form= 
vial&strength=1ml+of+10miu&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
160 GoodRx.com, “Pegintron,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/pegintron/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Pegintron&form= 
vial&strength=150mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
161 GoodRx.com, “Pegintron,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/pegintron/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Pegintron&form= 
vial&strength=150mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
162 GoodRx.com, “Pegintron,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/pegintron/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Pegintron&form= 
vial&strength=150mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
163 GoodRx.com, “Avonex,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/avonex/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Avonex&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=vial+of+30mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=18450&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens164 






↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: No 
Cold Chain: Yes 
GoodRx.com used, 
brand name only avail., 
carton of 12 syringes, 
each syringe is 44mcg, 
one syringe per day for 
ten days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens166 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens167 






↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
GoodRx.com used, 
generic selected, dose 
packs of tablets in 
No 
164 GoodRx.com, “Avonex,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/avonex/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Avonex&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=vial+of+30mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=56670&language=&store-chain=. 
165 GoodRx.com, “Avonex,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/avonex/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Avonex&form=dose+ 
pack&strength=vial+of+30mcg%2F0.5ml&quantity=custom&qty-custom=113390&language=&store-chain=. 
166 GoodRx.com, “Rebif,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rebif/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Rebif&form=carton& 
strength=12+syringes+of+44mcg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=1845&language=&store-chain=. 
167 GoodRx.com, “Rebif,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rebif/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Rebif&form=carton& 
strength=12+syringes+of+44mcg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=5667&language=&store-chain=. 
168 GoodRx.com, “Rebif,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/rebif/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=Rebif&form=carton& 
strength=12+syringes+of+44mcg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=11339&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
Prednisone inflammatory 10mg w/ 21 tablets per 
pack, two tablets per 
day for ten days 
• Price quote for 1,845 
ten-day regimens169 
• Price quote for 5,667 
ten-day regimens170 





↓ Virus Rep: No 





Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 
None are FDA licensed 





Oseltamivir + Relenza 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $320K 
5,667= $984K 
11,339= $1.25M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Oseltamivir + Ribavirin 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $225K 
5,667= $691K 
11,339= $1.38M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Relenza + Ribavirin 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $141K 
5,667= $435K 
11,339= $870K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 





169 GoodRx.com, “Prednisone,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/prednisone/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=prednisone& 
form=dose+pack&strength=21+tablets+of+10mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=1845&language=&store-chain=. 
170 GoodRx.com, “Prednisone,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/prednisone/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=prednisone& 
form=dose+pack&strength=21+tablets+of+10mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=5667&language=&store-chain=. 
171 GoodRx.com, “Prednisone,” (n.d.), http://www.goodrx.com/prednisone/price#/?distance=19&filter-location=&coords=&label=prednisone& 
form=dose+pack&strength=21+tablets+of+10mg&quantity=custom&qty-custom=11339&language=&store-chain=. 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
Combo-Therapy: 
Amantadine + Ribavirin 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp: No 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $26,250. 
5,667= $80,960. 
11,339= $162K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Oseltamivir + Atorvastatin 
(Lipitor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $211K 
5,667= $647K 
11,339= $1.29M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Oseltamivir + Rosuvastatin 
(Crestor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $307K 
5,667= $942K 
11,339= $1.9M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Oseltamivir + Simvastatin 
(Zocor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $204K 
5,667= $626K 
11,339= $1.25M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Oseltamivir + Gemfibrozil 
(Lopid) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $206K 
5,667= $632K 
11,339= $1.26M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Relenza + Atorvastatin (Lipitor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $127K 
5,667= $145K 
11,339= $783K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Relenza + Rosuvastatin (Crestor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $223K 
5,667= $686K 
11,339= $1.4M 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Relenza + Simvastatin (Zocor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $120K 
5,667= $370K 
11,339= $740K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 





Combo-Therapy: ↓ Virus Rep: Yes 1,845 = $122K Bulk Store: Yes Combo packs not avail., No 
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Therapy Medical Efficacy Cost Logistical Considerations Citations 
Good Choice for 
a State 
Stockpile? 
Yes or No 
Antivirals + Statins 
Relenza + Gemfibrozil (Lopid) 








Antivirals + Statins 
Ribavirin + Atorvastatin 
(Lipitor) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $32K 
5,667= $98K 
11,339= $197K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Ribavirin + Rosuvastatin 
(Crestor) 
Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $128K 
5,667= $393K 
11,339= $787K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Ribavirin + Simvastatin (Zocor) 
Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $25K 
5,667= $77K 
11,339= $154K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Antivirals + Statins 
Ribavirin + Gemfibrozil (Lopid) 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $27K 
5,667= $84K 
11,339= $167K 
Bulk Store: Yes 
Cold Chain: No 






Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, 
PegIntron/Rebetol Combo 
Pack 
↓ Virus Rep: Yes 
↓ Imm. Resp:Yes 
Other: N/A 
1,845 = $0 
5,667= $0 
11,339= $0 
Bulk Store: No 
Cold Chain: Yes No Data Available No Data Available 
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V.  DISCUSSION 
The idea behind this thesis was born when the Nevada PHP program logistician 
and the author were tasked with conducting an inventory of the state’s stockpile of 
antivirals and PPE in the Spring of 2013. At that time, the CDC was convening weekly 
teleconferences with all of its state-level partners to discuss the increasing H7N9 threat. 
As the weekly teleconferences took on a more somber tone, those who serve within the 
state of Nevada’s PHP program began a pre-incident command structure to assist in the 
state’s preparations and planning. One of the first orders of business by that command 
group was to inventory and update the state response plans for pandemics, as well as to 
verify the amount of all the antivirals and PPE contained within the state PHP program’s 
warehouse. It was in the midst of these efforts at the state PHP program’s warehouse 
when the logistician and the author began discussing their concerns about “what to do if 
some or all these antivirals are not effective” and “what other tools in the public health 
‘toolbox’ are available in response to a pandemic?” This thesis is the author’s attempt to 
answer those two questions and to help make Nevada better prepared to respond to such a 
daunting task as facing a pandemic strain virus (be that a type-A influenza virus or a 
HCoV). 
One of the more apparent issues revealed by the analysis to this research is how 
expensive a potential state-level stockpile could become, particularly when brand name 
medications are considered as candidates. Although medical efficacy does not appear to 
be as significant a limiting factor, cost and logistical considerations certainly narrow the 
field down to only a few options. In this era of declining grant funds, and an all-hazards 
approach, could (and some would even argue should) these “few options” even be 
considered as a possible investment in state-level prevention efforts? 
A.  THE PARADOX OF PREVENTION  
Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg recently discussed the paradox of prevention issue in an 
article he wrote for the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). Dr. 
Fineberg’s article provides a list of a dozen reasons as to why “prevention is so regularly 
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resisted;” he then continues to explain how preventative approaches differ from the more 
easily accepted curative approaches within American culture.172 For a graduate thesis 
interested in exploring the idea of expanding a state’s existing stockpile of curative 
approaches to include more treatment options, the Fineberg article helps describe the 
cultural and political environment in which that proposal would unfold. This reality may 
help to formulate a series of options for public health leadership to decide upon. An 
example of providing “options” to public health leadership (at the state level) could be, 1) 
select a therapy or therapies, and purchase the full range of regimens in one large 
expenditure of funds, 2) select a therapy or therapies to purchase over multiple budget 
periods (a.k.a. incremental approach), 3) select a therapy or therapies and not purchase 
them, but instead establish contracts with pharmaceutical vendors to purchase them based 
off a pre-designated trigger (e.g., pandemic of sustained human-to-human transmission 
declared by the CDC and/or WHO, etc.) in times of need, or 4) not select any new 
therapy or therapies, and continue to rely on existing state stockpiles and projected SNS 
materials.  
B.  KEY CONCEPTS 
1.  Stockpile Cost As a Percentage of a State’s Public Health 
Preparedness Budget 
Within the previous chapter, four therapies were identified as being a “good 
choice for a state stockpile:” a generic antiviral called Ribavirin, and three statins called 
generic Lipitor, generic Zocor, and generic Gemfibrozil. For each of those therapies, how 
do their price quotes compare to the current fiscal year’s total PHP grant for Nevada? To 
answer that question, it will be necessary to know what amounts of grant funding states 
(such as Nevada) are awarded. For many awardees, to include Nevada, their state and 
local PHP programs are completely funded by an aligned federal grant formed by the 
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
(PHEP) cooperative agreement. For each year of that aligned grant, the CDC publishes 
172 Harvey V. Fineberg, “The Paradox of Disease Prevention: Celebrated in Principle, Resisted in 
Practice,” Journal of the American Medical Association [JAMA] 310, no. 1 (2013): 85–90. 
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the amount of funding awarded to each state and territory on its website.173 The CDC’s 
annual award is based off a funding formula that “includes a base amount for each 
awardee plus population-based funding.”174 According to the CDC’s publication for the 
current budget period (a.k.a. Fiscal Year 2013), the state of Nevada receives the 
following amounts of federal HPP/PHEP grant funding. 
• HPP Budget Period 2 (Fiscal Year 2013) Funding: $3,256,408.00175 
• PHEP Budget Period 2 (Fiscal Year 2013) Funding: $6,482,206.00176 
• Total Funding (HPP + PHEP) for Budget Period 2: $9,738,614.00 
When the price quotes for each of the therapies listed in the previous chapter are 
taken, and divided into Nevada’s total PHP funding for the current budget period (e.g., 
$9.7M), those calculations result in the following options. 
a. Option 1—Generic Ribavirin 
1,845 ten-day regimens = $23,000, which would be approximately 0.23% of the PHP budget 
5,667 ten-day regimens = $71,000, which would be approximately 0.73% of the PHP budget 
11,339 ten-day regimens = $142,000, which would be approximately 1.5% of the PHP budget 
b. Option 2—Generic Lipitor 
1,845 ten-day regimens = $8,800, which would be approximately 0.09% of the PHP budget 
5,667 ten-day regimens = $27,000, which would be approximately 0.28% of the PHP budget 
11,339 ten-day regimens = $55,000, which would be approximately 0.6% of the PHP budget 
173 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], Procurement and Grants Office, Instructions 
for Preparing an Interim Progress Report ,Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number: 
93.074–National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program and Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness Program Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) Number: CDC-RFA-TP12-
120102CONT13, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/documents/TP12-120102CONT13_AMENDMENT_ 
03_25_13.pdf. 
174 Ibid., 27. 
175 Ibid., Appendix 1, 31. 
176 Ibid., Appendix 2, 33. 
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c. Option 3—Generic Zocor 
1,845 ten-day regimens = $2,000, which would be approximately 0.02% of the PHP budget 
5,667 ten-day regimens = $6,000, which would be approximately 0.06% of the PHP budget 
11,339 ten-day regimens = $12,000, which would be approximately 0.12% of the PHP budget 
d. Option 4—Generic Gemfibrozil 
1,845 ten-day regimens = $4,000, which would be approximately 0.04% of the PHP budget 
5,667 ten-day regimens = $12,400, which would be approximately 0.13% of the PHP budget 
11,339 ten-day regimens = $25,000, which would be approximately 0.26% of the PHP budget 
2. Balancing Therapies On-Hand with Those That Could be Needed 
Quite a few therapies listed within this thesis appear to be good choices for a state 
stockpile as well; yet, they are not included amongst the four candidate therapies: why is 
this? For some of those therapies, they are already included within the CDC’s SNS, and 
have been factored into state planning and projections for a response to a biological threat 
(e.g., antibiotics for use against bacterial threats, such as bacillus anthracis/anthrax, 
antivirals for use against pandemic strain influenza viruses, etc.). As discussed previously 
in this thesis, a portion of those SNS assets (e.g., antivirals and PPE) remain in state 
stockpiles as leftovers from the 2009–2010 H1N1 influenza response. In the case of 
Nevada, those materials account for quite a substantial state stockpile (these current totals 
for Nevada are as of June 2013). 
• Oseltamivir/Tamiflu: 54,808 regimens of various dosages (e.g., 30mg, 
45mg, 75mg, pediatric oral suspension, etc.) 
• Zanamivir/Relenza: 15,680 regimens of 5mg inhalers 
When those existing state stockpiles are compared against the hospitalization rate  
projections calculated previously (e.g., 1,845 / 5,667 / 11,339), they account for a 
sizeable portion of what Nevada would require to help treat or to provide prophylaxis to 
its citizens against a novel virus. When considering the fact that these existing stockpiles 
account for only 25% of each state’s total allotment at the CDC, then the purchase of 
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additional regimens (at great cost) is a difficult argument to make to public health 
leadership trying to “do more with less” in their budgets. 
When the issue of creating a state stockpile of antibiotics is raised, the same could 
be said for the antibiotics identified in the previous chapter, which are also included 
within the CDC’s SNS and would come in large numbers. An example would be the 
CDC’s 12-hour push package, which would arrive with 500,000 10-day regimens of 
various antibiotics (e.g., Ciprofloxacin, Doxycycline, etc.).177 As plentiful as the 12-hour 
push package’s materials may be, that federal asset would be in high demand during a 
pandemic; thus, from a planning perspective, states may not be able to rely on that asset 
arriving to their jurisdiction during such a “high-demand” scenario. As impressive as the 
12-hour push packages may be, they represent approximately 4% of the total assets 
controlled by the CDC’s DSNS. The remaining 96% of what the DSNS controls is called 
managed inventory (MI), and additional antibiotics are included within the MI as well. 
From a state-planning perspective, these materials within the MI are much more 
accessible in “high-demand” scenarios that those found within the 12-hour push package. 
When considering the fact that these existing federal stockpiles contain such large 
quantities of these therapies (in either the push package or the MI), then the purchase of 
additional regimens at a state-level is a difficult argument to make with public health 
leadership. 
C.  LESSONS LEARNED 
Pandemics involving novel strain influenza viruses, or coronaviruses, appear to be 
emerging with greater frequency. Over the span of 15 years, public health has witnessed a 
series of pandemic viruses. In the late 1990s, the world watched the emergence of the 
H5N1 avian influenza virus (that continues to smolder in Asia); in 2003, the SARS 
coronavirus erupted out of southeast China;  most recently, in 2009, the H1N1 influenza 
pandemic emanated out of Mexico. Currently, public health professionals are waiting and 
watching to see if H7N9 and MERS-CoV will become pandemic viruses. Just as 
177 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),” (n.d.), 
http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/stockpile.htm. 
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seismologists discuss when they believe “the big one” will occur in earthquake-prone 
places, such as San Francisco, public health professionals discuss when they believe the 
next “big one” (a.k.a. the next 1918-like pandemic) will occur. As the CDC and NIH are 
often quoted as saying, it is not “if” something like this will occur again but “when?”178 
1. Limitations to Interpretation 
A few issues limited this research, most notably, the fact that it is attempting to 
plan for a virus that probably does not yet exist. Although the articles and books used in 
this research provide a glimpse into what the global public health community is 
discussing, they do not provide a definitive protocol on how to treat pandemic strain 
viruses. This research was also limited by a lack of knowing the full range of medical 
therapies available in the nation’s SNS. The agency responsible for screening, testing, 
and selecting medical countermeasures (MCM) for inclusion into the SNS is the 
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, more commonly referred to 
as BARDA.179 For security reasons, the full list of what MCM are included within the 
nation’s stockpiles are not published openly; therefore, a comparison of the four therapies 
revealed through this research could not be made against a list of what BARDA has 
included in its stockpile roster.  
In Chapter IV, the Nevada state demographer’s census data were used to help 
calculate the gross attack rate, the hospitalization rate, and the mortality rate estimates 
specific to Nevada in the aftermath of a pandemic. A key flaw to using this data is that it 
only reflects Nevada resident population, and does not compensate for the additional 
population of its visitors. Depending on the time of year, Nevada’s overall population can 
swell by nearly 20% with the addition of the state’s tourist population (e.g., New Years’ 
Eve celebrations on the Las Vegas Strip, etc.). As an example for two of the state’s 
largest cities, tourism data report that nearly 40 million visitors came to Las Vegas in 
178 Taubenberger and Morens, “1918 Influenza: The Mother of All Pandemics,” 20. 
179 Public Health Emergency [PHE], “BARDA Leadership Biographies,” (n.d.), http://www.phe.gov/ 
about/barda/bio/Pages/default.aspx. 
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2012, and nearly 4.1 million visitors are expected to see Reno each year.180 Estimates for 
tourist population are difficult to discern. Therefore, in an effort to keep the calculations 
as straight forward as possible, this research only calculated for Nevada residents as listed 
in the state’s demography data. 
Chapter IV also made heavy use of an online accessible (open source) 
pharmaceutical bulk price quoting website called GoodRx. As useful as this system was 
in providing citable price quotes, it would have be wise to run the same price quote 
calculations through a nationally published tool, such as Red Book. Based off 
consultations with colleagues who work in the pharmaceutical business, the Red Book 
price index would have been the most accurate with which to work. With access to the 
Red Book system being limited, its use would have hampered any citations linking price 
quotes used in this thesis to an accessible system.  
2. Areas of Future Research 
Since the emergence of H5N1 avian influenza in the late 1990s, the topic of 
expanding the roster of treatment and/or prophylaxis options in the face of a pandemic 
strain virus has received a great deal of discussion and study. With so many 
global/national/academic institutions within public health searching for new, and 
improving upon existing, drug therapies, the list of potential therapies will continue to 
expand. Future study will need to build upon this growing list of potential options. Those 
studies could look for effective options that not only address the virus replication and 
immune system challenges raised in this thesis, but they could possibly explore new 
pathways for limiting disease in people afflicted by pandemic strain viruses as well.  
With the price of supplementing existing state stockpiles with more options, the 
issue of cost will undoubtedly continue. One of the first questions public health leaders 
are expected to ask would be if is possible to receive this recommended therapy from the 
DSNS? To answer that question, it will be necessary to know if BARDA has included 
any or all of these recommended therapies into its national roster. In an effort to balance 
180 Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, “Stats and Facts,” (n.d.), http://www.lvcva.com/ 
stats-and-facts; Reno/Tahoe Visitor, “General Information for 2012–2013,” (n.d.), http://www.renotahoe 
visitor.com/pdfs/VisitorMediaKit.pdf, 1. 
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security concerns with research, perhaps future study could answer in a simple “yes” or 
“no” format if recommended therapies are included within the nation’s stockpile? For 
states that have conducted their own calculations to determine how many regimens they 
would need, then perhaps those estimates could be compared to the quantities included by 
BARDA in the stockpile as well?  
If more time were available for this research, it would have been useful to 
quantify how large of a “logistical footprint” these proposed therapies would take in a 
state PHP program’s warehouse. Once a determination is made as to how many regimens 
of a therapy would be needed, the next logical step would be to convert those estimates 
into length/width/height calculations. Bulk items, such as medications and PPE, take up 
space within a warehouse, which is often described as volume (e.g., two square yards per 
pallet, etc.). Although the GoodRx website is useful in estimating how much a specific 
therapy would possibly cost, it does not provide any detail as to how much space those 
materials would need to occupy. The ability to convert bulk orders into detailed estimates 
for how much volume those materials would occupy in a warehouse is yet another useful 
piece of information for future studies to explore.  
The next logistical consideration that would need to be included in a proposal to 
expand a state’s stockpile is the manufacturers’ recommended expiration date for each 
therapy. The shelf life of a stockpiled therapy would need to be as long as possible; thus, 
extending the benefit of investing in such a prevention strategy. An unintended benefit 
for Nevada when it received 25% of its allotted antivirals and PPE during the 2009/2010 
H1N1 response is that the state had to develop strong systems to track/manage/destroy 
those materials as they expired. If future studies could build upon those newly acquired 
skill sets, and help improve the system that allow states to track and manage an expanded 
state stockpile, then that would also be useful for pandemic planning purposes.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this environment of “‘do more with less,” it is difficult to provide a single 
recommendation that will bolster state response capabilities. In an effort to provide public 
health leaders with a set of options to chose from, this thesis lists four possible therapies 
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being recommended to state lawmakers from which to select. Although each of the  
options requires the addition of more medications to the state’s existing stockpile, the 
options vary by when those materials are to be purchased.  
Recommendation 1:  Purchase Generic Lipitor, Generic Zocor and Generic 
Gemfibrozil to Supplement State Stockpiles in One Purchase 
This recommendation would expand the current state stockpile to include three 
generic statins (Lipitor, Zocor and Gemfibrozil) that can help limit the body’s immune 
response within patients suffering from pandemic viruses. This observed medical efficacy 
(of reducing a physiological response to infection, in this example, the cytokine storm) is 
particularly appealing because it is independent of a specific virus strain. Regardless of 
the viral strain infecting a patient and causing pneumonia, these statins will help lower 
the immune response to that infection within the lungs. For many people who fall ill with 
a pandemic strain virus, this lowering of their body’s immune response within their lungs 
may be the difference between succumbing to the infection versus surviving the 
infection. From a medical efficacy point-of-view, they are appealing for the synergistic 
effect they have on pandemic strain viruses when used in tandem with antivirals (existing 
state stockpiles have two types of antivirals discussed previously). Although the scientific 
explanations behind these synergistic effects are still being studied, the literature makes a 
strong case for the use of antivirals and statins administered together as a complementary 
treatment option to healthcare providers. These recommended statins are appealing for 
other reasons as well. They are affordable at bulk rates, they are well known to both the 
public and healthcare providers, and they are easily stored long term in climate-controlled 
warehouses.  
Three key limitations to this recommendation are: 1) statins do not have any 
efficacy when used as a prophylaxis against novel viruses; thus, they could only be used 
as a treatment therapy, 2) purchasing a stockpile all at once may lead to drug expiration 
dates that may be the same, or close together, and 3) the cost projections for the 11,339 
tier will exceed the 1% limit set for Nevada’s PHP budget (as discussed in Chapter III).  
One of the many lessons that states learned from absorbing such a large inject of 
MCM in the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 response was that many of those medications 
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would expire later en masse. Without fastidious attention to stockpile expiration dates, a 
state could lose a large portion of its stockpile quite literally overnight. Many of those 
planning considerations were learned through experience, and mitigated through budget 
planning and stockpile rotation. For this option to work, those same strategies would need 
to be employed. 
Even for a worse-case planning scenario (e.g., the maximum lethality of a 
pandemic), the projected cost for purchasing all three statins would just barely fall within 
the 1% limit. The breakdowns of the projected percentage of Nevada’s PHP budget are as 
follows in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Recommendation One Described as a Percentage of Nevada’s PHP Budget 







0.09% of PHP Budget 0.28% of PHP Budget 0.6% of PHP Budget 
Zocor 
(generic) 
0.02% of PHP Budget 0.06% of PHP Budget 0.12% of PHP Budget 
Gemfibrozil 
(generic) 0.04% of PHP Budget 0.13% of PHP Budget 0.26% of PHP Budget 
Totals 0.15% of PHP Budget 0.47% of PHP Budget 0.98% of PHP Budget 
 
For the price, and for the ease of storage, these three complementary therapies 
may help broaden the range of treatment options that Nevada’s current state stockpile 
provides. From a state planning perspective, to have a set of affordable and 
complementary therapies that work independently of a specific virus strain would be a 
welcomed addition to a state-level stockpile. 
Recommendation 2:  Purchase Generic Ribavirin/Zocor/Gemfibrozil 
Incrementally over Multiple Budget Periods 
As appealing as the first option may be, it may be a wise investment to expand the 
state’s existing stockpile of antivirals to include another, Ribavirin, as well. The research 
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indicates that this additional antiviral therapy has significant medical efficacy when used 
either as a prophylaxis, or as a treatment. The research continues to discuss the 
synergistic effect this medication has when used in conjunction with other antivirals (e.g., 
Oseltamivir, Relenza, etc.), as well as statins. To have yet another prophylaxis and/or 
treatment option, that complements what is already on hand, would be a force multiplier 
within a public health response to a pandemic.  
If the price to purchase any of these therapies in one large expenditure were too 
great, then perhaps a more incremental approach over a number of budget years would be 
more appealing? If the economic impact to the state’s PHP budget could be spread over a 
few years, then the idea of adding Ribavirin to the list may be plausible as well. Although 
the generic version of this therapy at 11,339 ten-day regimens exceeds the 1% of total 
budget limit, that price may be easier to absorb if spread over many years. The 
breakdowns of the projected percentage of Nevada’s PHP budget for Fiscal Year 2013 
are as follows in Table 8. 
Table 8.   Recommendation Two Described as a Percentage of Nevada’s PHP Budget 







0.23% of PHP Budget 0.73% of PHP Budget 1.5% of PHP Budget 
Zocor 
(generic) 
0.02% of PHP Budget 0.06% of PHP Budget 0.12% of PHP Budget 
Gemfibrozil 
(generic) 0.04% of PHP Budget 0.13% of PHP Budget 0.26% of PHP Budget 
Totals 0.29% of PHP Budget 0.92% of PHP Budget 1.88% of PHP Budget 
 
When each of these totals are divided by the 1% budget limit per fiscal year 
budget, the following estimates are generated for the number of years it would take to 
assemble each tier. For the 1,845 tier it would take one budget period; for the 5,667 tier, 
it too would take one budget period; and for the 11,339 tier, it would take approximately 
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two budget periods to assemble that amount of therapies. Each of these timeframes are 
strategic considerations for any state, with Nevada being no different. Therefore, 
committing to a long-term investment of this nature would require a great deal of support 
by public health leadership.  
A benefit to compiling a state stockpile of this size, over these many years, is that 
stock rotation would be inherent in the system. As newer medications are brought into the 
stockpile, older medications would be rotated out as they expire. This cycle would help 
prevent that potential loss of a state stockpile “overnight” as was discussed previously.  
Recommendation 3: Establish Purchasing Contracts for Generic 
Ribavirin/Zocor/Gemfibrozil in “Times of Need” 
Stockpiles of any kind are by their very nature large investments in material, 
money, space, and staff hours. As budgets continue to decline, many leaders within 
government are hesitant to commit to this level of investment. However, federal 
preparedness grants are rather clear in determining what capabilities and resources state 
and local partners would need to “assure safer, more resilient, and better prepared 
communities.”181 Within the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Capabilities, the 
CDC and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) have defined what 
resource elements they consider key to accomplishing this resiliency and preparedness: 
“a public health agency has either the ability to have, or has access to, the resource 
element.”182 It is that second point about public health agencies having “access to” 
resource elements that would help support this recommendation. 
Rather than purchase, maintain, and rotate supplemental therapies within an 
existing state stockpile, another option is for a state to create contracts with vendors that 
would be activated upon a pre-determined trigger. An example of such a trigger for 
pandemic influenza or coronavirus could be to prepare a pre-written state contract to 
181 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response [PHPR], Public Health Preparedness Capabilities: National Standards for State and Local 
Planning, “Executive Summary,” March 2011, http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/capabilities/executive 
summary.pdf, 2. 
182 Ibid., 5. 
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purchase 1,845/5,667/11,339 ten-day regimens of therapy “A” (the exact wording could 
reflect any therapy) that would go into effect when the U.S. government declares Stage 4 
(first confirmed human case in North America), or when the WHO declares Phase 6 
(increased and sustained transmission in general population).183 In this example, the 
action that made a contract go into effect was based off third party “triggers;” in reality, 
those could be pre-written to activate off a state health officer’s request, etc. This 
recommended option would provide a set of medical therapies known to have medical 
efficacy against pandemic viruses. Some of these therapies would provide additional 
prophylaxis and treatment options during a pandemic, while others could only be used for 
treatment. In each case, these medications would expand the current list of options 
available to public health and clinical providers during a pandemic.  
From the perspective of logistics, this option would still require some planning 
considerations. Although the materials would be brought in during a “time of need,” they 
would still require enough space set aside somewhere for all these medications to be 
received and stored within a climate-controlled warehouse with little notice of their 
arrival. As was previously discussed, to plan properly for this scenario, a detailed 
estimate of their logistical footprint (a.k.a. how much space they would need to occupy 
within a warehouse) would need to be calculated as well. If such a contract would go in 
effect at some undetermined time, then the pre-planning for those materials would require 
that adequate square footage (defined in terms of length, width, and height) be ready to 
receive them.  
E. SUMMARY 
With the global population expected to increase by 50% in 50 years (from 
approximately six billion in the year 2000 to approximately nine billion by the year 
2050), the world may be in an epoch of human history whereby pandemics involving 
183 World Health Organization [WHO], “Pandemic Influenza: WHO Global Pandemic Phases and 
Stages for Federal Government Response,” (n.d.). C:\Users\chdsstudent\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ 
Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\S94DQWVQ\AppE.pdf, 56. 
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novel viruses may appear with greater frequency and lethality.184 Existing plans and 
preparations at the federal, state and local level of government are comprised of a whole 
series of interventions, from mass vaccination and mass dispensing, to hygiene and social 
distancing. This research focused on one component of that broad set of interventions, 
treatment and prophylaxis. 
Since the successful completion of the 2009–2010 response to the H1N1 
pandemic, many states have acquired and maintained state stockpiles of antiviral 
medications and PPE. As those same states prepare for future pandemics involving novel 
viruses, some state planners are looking to expand their current stockpiles to include 
more treatment and prophylaxis options. This research identifies four such medications: 
an antiviral that could be used as a treatment option or as a prophylaxis option, called 
generic Ribavirin; three statins that could be employed solely as treatment options: 
generic Lipitor, generic Zocor, and generic Gemfibrozil.  
With planning for pandemics that would involve viruses that may not yet exist, 
this ability to expand state stockpiles with more treatment and prophylaxis options may 
be a sound investment. Nearly all prevention efforts come with some kind of cost, be they 
in money, time, or space; yet, these recommended medical therapies are preventative 
efforts against some of the most dangerous threats posed to humanity, pandemics. This 
research is one state’s attempt at exploring what other options may exist. This research 
has attempted to open a dialogue with other federal and state planners as they wrestle 
with the same challenges within their home agencies. As terrible as pandemics may be, 
sound precautions can be taken now to be better prepared for something (like a 
pandemic) tomorrow. 
184 World-o-meters, “World Population Clock,” (n.d.), http://www.worldometers.info/world-
population/. 
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